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THE UNTOUCHABLES: WHY A VOCATIONAL
EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY HEARINGS CANNOT BE
TOUCHED
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely
depend on the mode by which it was reached.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Without vocational expert (“VE”) testimony and reliance on the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) disability determination process would crumble,
similar to building blocks collapsing when a foundational block is
removed.2 This is because VE testimony is a building block upon which

1
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[s]ecrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness
gives too slender an assurance of rightness. . . . Nor has a better way been found for
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been
done[]”). Although alarming, this analogy is meant to demonstrate the seemingly
controversial deference afforded to vocational experts within disability hearings. See infra
note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the deference granted to vocational experts
within SSA disability hearings). Because of the deference granted to these experts, the
disability claimant faces an uphill battle in discrediting the VE’s testimony. See infra note
68 and accompanying text (discussing the difficultly in challenging the VE’s testimony). A
balancing-act between the fairness afforded to claimants and the need for efficiency
mandates that the Agency’s superficial safeguards should not generate a feeling in the
government that justice has been done. See LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE:
UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 2 (2002) (discussing that with the large
monetary award implications and the SSA’s burden of deciding so many disability cases,
pressure exists to deny claims and decide the claims quickly); see also Michael C. Mason,
Comment, The Scientific Evidence Problem: A Philosophical Approach, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 887, 906
(2001) (discussing how the moral authority upon which scientific evidence is based must
include the implications of justice and truth seeking). Thus, with the SSA disability
adjudication process, “[j]ustice cannot be achieved without the presumption that the legal
process is ‘finding’ truth[.]” Mason, supra, at 906.
2
DAVID F. TRAVER, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADVOCATE’S HANDBOOK § 1400 (2006).
The “SSA’s reliance upon the underlying assumption and the data of the DOT . . . is the
keystone in the arch which holds up . . . the entire vocational framework at the Social
Security Administration.” Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, “the DOT has never been
reliable” and is merely “a job placement tool that, at its margins, has masqueraded as
reliable vocational evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, shockingly, “the DOT and its
underlying assumptions [remain] . . . fundamental to the determination of the outcome in
millions of disability claims annually.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that “when a grave
injustice is wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a
matter of concern to everyone[]”); TRAVER, supra, § 1700 (stating that “[t]he end-point of
most disability claims that are adjudicated at the SSA are resolved for better or worse at
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the whole SSA system is built.3 When the integrity of the foundation is
compromised, the entire system becomes unstable.4 Thus, it follows that
because the validity of VE testimony has been compromised, the entire
SSA disability determination process is susceptible to collapse.5
As the largest system of administrative adjudication in the western
world, the SSA has drastically experienced an increase in the number of
claims filed each year.6 Consequently, with an adjudication system this
large, it is only natural that Congress requires the federal judiciary to
ensure the SSA affords disability claimants a certain level of fairness and
decide cases correctly.7 Yet, multiple aspects of federal judicial disability
step five of the sequential evaluation process[]”); MILLS, supra note 1, at 111 (explaining that
a VE’s presence at a hearing can make or break the case for a claimant).
3
MILLS, supra note 1, at 111. The VE relies upon The Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”) to reach conclusions because the disability adjudication process’s reliance upon
the VE and the DOT are firmly embedded in the SSA’s Regulations and Rulings. See Social
Security Ruling 82–61 (Aug. 20, 1980), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/
rulings/di/02/SSR82-61-di-02.html (discussing the authority of the DOT and the necessity
of calling a VE to testify); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the use of a
VE and other occupational information in disability decisions).
4
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302. Before the use of VEs may be permitted in SSA
hearings, the SSA must have a “rational decision” regarding vocational issues. Id. (citing
Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 921 (2d Cir. 1960)). Although the SSA attempted to
address this issue by relying upon “selected government and industrial studies[,]” the
courts eventually rejected that approach because the reports were “speculative and
theoretical in determining whether there were employment opportunities available to
disability claimants . . . .” Id. To address this issue that put the system on the brink of
collapse, the SSA “decided to employ vocational experts . . . [who] would address their
testimony to the claimant’s particular and highly individual situation in an effort to satisfy
the Kerner criteria.” Id. (citing SSA History of SSA During the Johnson Administration
1963–1968, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/lbjoper5.html (discussing the
history leading up to the implementation of VEs within SSA disability hearings and why
there is a need for reliable vocational evidence)).
5
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900 (stating that “[a]fter all of those years and all of those
hearings, such an attorney has no way of knowing if the VEs gave honest and accurate
answers, or if the testimony was made up out of whole cloth[]”); see also Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (stating that the “[r]eview of the
evidence is of no value to us[] [because] [t]he vice is in the procedure which allows it in
without testing it . . . . ”).
6
See MARGARET C. JASPER, SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 7 (2004) (stating that “[a]s of 2003,
approximately 7,595,452 disabled workers and their dependents were receiving
benefits[]”); Jianting Hu et al., A Structural Model of Social Security’s Disability Determination
Process 1 (Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, Working Paper No. 72, 1997),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp72.pdf (stating that with
the SSA accepting 2.5 million applications a year, “its budgetary and welfare implications
are undeniable[]”).
7
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how in Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916,
921 (2d Cir. 1960), the issue of why the SSA needed substantial vocational evidence was
addressed for the first time); Larry M. Gropman, Social Security, 1996 DET. C.L. REV. 517,

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/8

Hubley: The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert's Testimony in Social S

2008]

Social Security Disability Hearings

355

proceedings are flawed; specifically, the way in which VE testimony is
evaluated is problematic.8
The integrity of VE testimony has been compromised for several
reasons, including the fact that “[t]here presently are no standards to
become a vocational expert, no training, no supervision, and no
credential requirements.”9 Additionally, the vocational field is a
relatively new discipline and the methodology invoked by VEs in
analyzing DOT data and vocational information of a disability claimant
is not an exact science.10 In fact, the point at which a scientific principle
crosses the line from experimental to demonstrable is often debated.11
Still, the SSA “figures [that] the DOT and its related data are ‘better than
nothing.’ But ‘better than nothing’ is not a reliable basis [from which] to
award and deny critical life-sustaining benefits to the disabled and
518 (1996) (discussing the importance of providing a judicial check on an unavoidably
bureaucratic and budget conscious system). But see Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84
(1909) (“[W]hat is due process of law depends on [the] circumstances. It varies with the
subject-matter and the necessities of the situation.”).
8
See JEFFREY SCOTT WOLFE & LISA B. POSZEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL 260 (2003) (discussing specific issues that warrant review including:
the ALJ erred; the record as a whole did not support the ALJ’s decision; the ALJ was
biased; the ALJ disregarded applicable Social Security rulings; or due process was not
followed). See also MILLS, supra note 1, at 57. “In general, when abuse of discretion was
detected, . . . [one of the] primary explanations[] . . . [was that] vocational testimony was
either inadequate or misrepresented” during the course of the hearing. Id. Other reversible
errors occurred when the ALJ’s questioning of VEs during the hearing was flawed. Id. at
58.
9
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302. But see Daniel F. Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social
Security Hearings, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, 197, 209 (1998) (explaining that under
the SSA’s guidelines found in HALLEX, the ALJ is required to administer an oath; qualify
the VE by ensuring impartiality, expertise, and professional qualifications; ask the claimant
if there are any objections to the VE testifying; and finally, rule on any objections). In
addition to the lack of standards for VEs, the VE testimony lacks validity because it is
based on the outdated DOT, and thus the system fails because the real world changes and
the DOT data does not keep pace. TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1; see also WOLFE & POSZEK,
supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation law Manual (HALLEX),
which is a two-volume manual that provides procedures for carrying out administration
policies, and guidance for processing and adjudicating claims at the SSA).
10
See “The American Board of Vocational Experts’ Overview Page,”
http://www.abve.net/overview.htm (stating that the American Board of Vocational
Experts, which represents both the private and the public sectors, was founded in 1980 to
preserve the integrity, standards, ethics, and uniqueness of vocational experts); see also
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (stating that comprehending the vastness of employment
data requires a taxonomy, i.e., a classification system, but this system is insufficient because
of the inability of VEs to accurately base the claimant’s vocational history with outdated
data from the DOT).
11
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussing the important role
that expert testimony plays in the judicial process); see infra note 109 and accompanying
text (discussing in detail the implications of the Frye holding).
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disadvantaged.”12 It is someplace within “this twilight zone [that] the
evidentia[ry] force of . . . [a scientific] principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony[,] . . . the
thing from which [a] deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”13
This Note discusses ways in which the SSA can avoid the
disintegration of the disability determination process by protecting the
integrity of disability proceedings and assuring claimants are afforded
an adequate level of fairness. Part II of this Note discusses the SSA
system, namely the aspects of disability hearings, the role of VEs within
these hearings, and the evidentiary standards implemented pre- and
post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.14 Part III explains the
extent to which the SSA relies on the testimony of VEs and discusses
Social Security enactments, such as Social Security Ruling 00-4p (“S.S.R.
00-4p”), which were implemented to ensure fairness in disability
proceedings; Part III also analyzes the possibility of implementing a
Daubert-type standard to evaluate VE testimony to ensure that a
disability claimant is afforded an adequate level of fairness.15 Finally,
Part IV proposes a solution in the form of a model Rule to resolve these
issues.16
II. BACKGROUND
The SSA is a large and intricate adjudication system that is
constantly evolving.17 This Part discusses the historical development,
12
TRAVER, supra note 2, §1400. “Traditionally slow to act in the face of change, [the] SSA
so far has published no regulations to bridge the divide between” the obsolete DOT and its
methodology and new and updated occupational sources. Id. § 1503. See also JASPER, supra
note 6, at 7 (discussing the immense effect that disability benefits have on people’s lives
and that “[a]lmost 3 in 10 of today’s 20 year-olds will become disabled before reaching age
67[]”); Claire R. Kelly, The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the Regulatory Realm, 26 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 469, 471 (2006) (discussing the situations in which a standard needs to be
implemented to ensure that federal agencies are relying upon acceptable evidence to base
conclusions); infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the outdated methodology of
the DOT and the updated occupational source O*NET).
13
Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (discussing the need for expert testimony to be based on a solid
foundation that is generally accepted in the particular field in question).
14
See infra notes 17–139 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 141–212 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 214–38 and accompanying text.
17
For the disability claimant who has filed an appeal and requested a hearing in front of
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the SSA will assign a hearing date at which the
claimant will have his chance in front of an ALJ at the SSA Office of Disability Adjudication
and Review (“ODAR”). See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 247. Upon entering the
hearing room, the claimant will be greeted by the ALJ who will provide an introductory
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functional aspects, and policy objectives of the SSA system.18 First, Part
II.A provides an overview of the Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) program.19 Next, Part II.B discusses the functional
aspects of the SSA’s disability hearings—namely, the five-step sequential
disability determination process.20
Part II.C discusses the policy
objectives of the SSA (regarding VEs), the DOT, and other occupational
sources used to support VE testimony.21 Last, Part II.D addresses preand post-Daubert evidentiary approaches, and policies that the SSA has
introduced since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22
A. Overview of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program
The SSA, with the authority granted to it by the Social Security Act,23
provides cash and insurance benefits24 to individuals through two
statement explaining the nature of the hearing and stating the issues to be addressed. Id. If
there are any exhibits not already submitted into the administrative record, the claimant
will have a chance to submit them to the ALJ, who will mark them and make each a part of
the record. Id. If the claimant is represented by counsel, he or she will make an opening
statement to the ALJ which frames the contours of the case and explains the theory of the
claim. Id. at 248. The next part of the hearing consists of the ALJ or the claimant’s counsel
asking the claimant a series of questions outlining the claimant’s impairments, limitations,
and daily activities. Id. If the claimant brings other witnesses, such as a significant other or
a family member, the ALJ will question those witnesses about the claimant’s condition and
limitations. Id. Next, the ALJ will examine the medical expert, making a general inquiry
about the claimant’s documented impairment(s) and elicit the expert’s opinion concerning
whether a listing is met. Id. Subsequently, the ALJ will examine the VE, “eliciting the
expert’s opinion about the nature of the claimant’s past relevant work, specifying exertion
and skill level; followed by an inquiry about transferable skills; and ending in a series of
hypothetical questions in which various limitations are expressed as part of the claimant’s
(hypothetical) residual functional capacity.” Id. Last, the closing argument is presented, or
if the claimant does not have an attorney, the ALJ will ask if the claimant has anything
more that the ALJ should know before the ALJ makes a decision. Id.
18
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part II.A.
20
See infra Part II.B.
21
See infra Part II.C.
22
509 U.S. 579 (1993); see infra Part II.D.
23
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2000) (discussing the purpose and scope of the Social
Security Act).
24
Jae Kennedy & Marjorie F. Olney, Factors Associated with Workforce Participation
Amount SSDI, 72 J. REHAB. 4 (2006) (stating that “[t]he Social Security Disability Insurance
. . . program provides cash benefits and health insurance to approximately 6.8 million
disabled workers and their families, at a total annual cost of about $66 billion[]”).
Incentives for applying for these benefits have been drastically affected by changes in
institutional, economic, and demographic factors. See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 2. An
example of institutional factors is reductions in state programs assisting the impaired, thus
shifting the reliance from state agencies to the SSA. Id. Examples of economic and
demographic factors include an aging population, the rise in unemployment, a reduction in
the number of blue collar jobs, and the loss of health coverage for workers and their
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disability programs, both of which use the same disability determination
process, but both of which also have different, yet complementary,
goals.25 The first program is the Social Security DIB program, which is
part of the comprehensive social security insurance program,26 and the
second program is the Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)27 program,
families. Id. The application process consists of: (1) submitting an application to a Social
Security Administration District Office; (2) the District Office Representative (“Rep”) being
assigned the case and scheduling an initial interview with the claimant; (3) the Rep, in the
initial interview, checking the claimant’s non-medical criteria to ensure that the claimant is
below the full retirement age, has worked in at least five of the ten most recent years, and is
not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (4) if the claimant meets the nonmedical criteria, the application is forwarded to one of the Disability Determination
Services office (“DDS”) where medical examiners scrutinize medical evidence from one or
more of the claimant’s health care providers regarding the claimant’s capability of
performing employment; (5) if deemed necessary, the DDS will order that the claimant
undergo a consultative examination; and (6) if the DDS is able to find the claimant has an
impairment that meets or equals a Medical Listing, then the claimant is entitled to benefits.
WOLFE & PROSZEK, supra note 8, at 3–5. If the DDS denies the claimant’s application for
disability benefits, the claimant has several options, such as, the claimant can request: (1) a
reconsideration by a different team at the DDS; (2) a hearing in front of an Administrative
Law Judge; or (3) an appeal to the Social Security’s Appeal Council. Id. The Social Security
Act mandates that each Social Security claimant exhaust his administrative remedies before
appealing to a federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
25
See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11; see also David H. Autor and Mark G. Duggan, The Rise
in Disability Recipiency and the Decline in Unemployment 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8336, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8336 (stating
that the medical eligibility criteria for the two programs are identical).
26
MILLS, supra note 1, at 2. The DIB social insurance program is authorized under Title
II of the Act and is called the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program. See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 5. This program is funded through payroll tax
contributions allocated to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund. Id. The types of Title II
Benefits include retirement Insurance Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.310), Survivors’ Insurance
Benefits, and Disability Insurance Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.315). Survivors’ Insurance
Benefits include the following: Spouses and Divorced Spouses (20 C.F.R. § 404.330);
Child’s Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.350); Parent’s Benefits (20 C.F.R. § 404.370); Special
Payments at Age 72 (20 C.F.R. § 404.380); and Lump-Sum Death Payment (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.390). 20 C.F.R. § 404.301 (2006). Entitlement factors for Disability Insurance Benefits
are defined under 20 C.F.R. § 404.315 and require the following: (1) that the claimant be
under 65 years of age; (2) that the claimant file an application; (3) that the claimant satisfies
the disability insurance requirements located under 20 C.F.R. § 404.130; (4) that the
claimant is disabled as defined by the Act; and (5) that the claimant completed the five full
calendar months waiting period. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (2006).
27
MILLS, supra note 1, at 2. Authorized under Title XVI of the Act, the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) provides for disabled individuals who fail to meet the insured status
requirement:
(1) Every individual who—
(A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (as determined under
subsection (c)(1) of this section),
(B) has not attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(l) of this
title),
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which is a means-based program designed specifically to guarantee a
minimal level of income to only the poorest of the aged, blind, and
disabled.28 Because SSI benefits are means-based29 and consist of only
nine-percent30 of the benefits paid by the SSA, this Note focuses on DIB.31
(C) if not a United States citizen or national—
(i) has been assigned a social security account number that was, at the
time of assignment, or at any later time, consistent with the
requirements of subclause (I) or (III) of section 405(c)(2)(B)(i) of this
title; or
(ii) at the time any quarters of coverage are earned—
(I)is described in subparagraph (B) or (D) of section 1101(a)(15) of Title
8,
(II) is lawfully admitted temporarily to the United States for business
(in the case of an individual described in such subparagraph (B)) or the
performance as a crewman (in the case of an individual described in
such subparagraph (D)), and
(III) the business engaged in or service as a crewman performed is
within the scope of the terms of such individual's admission to the
United States.
(D) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and
(E) is under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this section),
shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (2000). In 1974, under President Richard Nixon, the SSI program was
introduced and targeted individuals who had limited income and were disabled. See John
R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal Program Insuring
Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 1 (2005–2006). See Social Security
Administration’s
SSI
Page,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/notices/supplementalsecurity-income. Unlike the Disability Insurance Benefits, the SSI benefits are not based on
prior work, and are financed by general funds of the U.S. Treasury. Id.
28
See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 1; see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 40 (explaining
that the SSI program is basically a type of welfare program).
29
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383f (2000). The Act provides supplemental security income for
disabled individuals who fail to meet the insured status requirement. Id.; see also Autor,
supra note 25, at 4 (stating that SSI benefits are means-tested and thus, there is no
requirement that the claimant have any prior work history); WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8,
at 40 (explaining that the SSI program is not based on a past history of employment like the
DIB program, from which payment into a trust fund creates an insured status).
30
See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 41. In July 2000, 6.5 million recipients received
SSI payments with the average monthly benefit of approximately $377. Id. This accounted
for roughly nine-percent of the benefits paid out by the SSA, and is significantly less than
the 86% of benefits paid out through the DIB program. Id.; see also JASPER, supra note 6, at 7
(stating that “[t]he passage of the Contract with American Advancement Act of 1996
narrowed the number of people allowed to receive SSI disability benefits by requiring that
drug addiction or alcoholism not be a material factor in their disability[]”).
31
A historical overview of the Disability Insurance program reveals that in 1954 the SSA
instituted the disability “freeze” which limited eligibility to persons disabled for at least six
months and whose earnings history proved a solid connection to the workforce. See
Kearney, supra note 27, at 1. Disability determinations were made by the states and
reimbursed through the Social Security trust fund. Id. It was in 1956 that monthly benefits
began to be provided to disabled workers aged 50–64. Id. Two years later in 1958, benefits
were established for the dependents of disabled workers. Id. In 1960, the harsh
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To be eligible for DIB, the SSA requires that an applicant be unable
to engage in “substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.”32 To make this
disability determination, and in an attempt to balance the need for
efficiency with the need of ensuring that a claimant is treated fairly, the
SSA adopted a subjective, five-step sequential process that considers the
uniqueness of a claimant’s impairment or impairments.33
requirement that a worker be at least 50 years old to be eligible for disability benefits was
eliminated. Id. Subsequently, in 1972 Medicare coverage was extended to Disability
Insurance beneficiaries after two years of entitlement. Id. In 1980, a cap was placed on
family benefits to disabled workers and periodic disability reviews were enacted, as well as
return-to-work incentives. Id. Subsequently in 1984, Congress addressed the issue of
mental related disabilities by implementing new criteria for adjudication of claims
involving mental impairments. Id. The new criteria greatly liberalized the disability
screening process by making disability benefits significantly more attainable to employees
with less severely disabling impairments, such as cognitive disorders and degenerative
musculoskeletal ailments. See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 1. Consequently, the
implementation of the new criteria broadened the previously narrowly defined disability
insurance benefits program to allow for an expanded population with a more subjectively
defined entitlement to disability insurance benefits. Id. at 2. The changes to the eligibility
requirements occurred as a result of actions taken by Congress and the courts. Id.
32
20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2006). The Social Security Act’s definition of disability has three
separate components: (1) the severity requirement (the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity); (2) the origin requirement (the disability must be based on a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment); and (3) the duration requirement
(qualifying impairment must last at least one year or be expected to result in death). Social
Security Act § 223(d)(2)(A). See also Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Evidentiary
Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17 (2003) (explaining that the three requirements must
be met; for example, a short-term disability, no matter how severe, is not sufficient to
establish eligibility under the Social Security Act). See also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212
(2002). In Walton, the claimant (Walton) challenged the Social Security Administration’s
determination that he was not entitled to disability benefits as a result of returning to parttime work eleven months after losing his full-time teaching job due to his serious cognitive
impairment. Id. at 1267. The claimant argued that the SSA’s interpretation of the statute’s
qualifications was unlawful. Id. at 1265. The Supreme Court started by addressing the
issue of whether or not the regulation of the durational requirement of the provision was
unlawful. Id. The Court determined that the provision made no explicit statements about
the duration of the claimant’s inability. Id. The statute did not unambiguously forbid the
SSA regulation. Id. Then, the Court considered the construction of the statute and
determined that there was no infringement. Id. The Court concluded that the SSA’s
interpretation was in line with the statute’s basic objectives, which necessitated some
durational requirement. Id. Consequently, the Court found that the interpretation did not
contradict the SSA’s own precedent regarding interpretation. Id. The Court held that the
SSA regulation was lawful and that the regulation of the duration provision was a
reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id.
33
S.S.R. 03-3p (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/
01/SSR2003-03-di-01.html (discussing the purpose of Social Security Ruling 03-3p). It is
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B. Functional Aspects of Social Security Hearings: The First Three Steps of
the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination Process
Like most valid and recognized adjudication systems, the SSA’s fivestep disability determination process is based on the notion of
fundamental fairness.34 Understanding how the five-step process works
is crucial; accordingly, two key concepts should be realized: first, the
analysis is sequential, meaning that the claimant cannot proceed from
one step to another until it is determined that he is didsabled; and
second, the analysis is a process, meaning that it requires consideration
of many elements, consisting of both medical and vocational evidence.35
In order for the process to begin, a claimant must first be eligible.36 If
a claimant is rendered unable to continue employment at any time
before age sixty-five, the claimant may be eligible for DIB as long as the
claimant meets the SSA’s standard for disability and is “deemed
‘insured’ because [the claimant has] worked the required number of
quarters for a person [of her] age and has contributed to the [SSA]
system.”37
important to realize that in the sequential evaluation process there are limited
opportunities for a claimant to be granted benefits. See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at
248. The claimant can be granted benefits at step three, e.g., the claimant meets or
medically equals a medical listing. Id. The claimant can also be granted benefits at stepfive, e.g., the claimant satisfies the requisite criteria for a disability award based on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”). Id. Last, the claimant can be granted benefits at
the second part of step five, e.g., the claimant is awarded disability benefits using the Grids
as a framework and the VE testifying that there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers
which the claimant can maintain. Id.
34
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of fairness and justice
within the adjudication system). See also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 50 (discussing
the underlying notion of fairness and justice that support the five-step framework).
Disability hearings before ALJs are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which governs the on the record adjudications. Id. at 244. These on the record hearings are
like regular judicial hearings in that they are recorded verbatim. Id. The record is crucial
for organization, and serves as an invaluable tool for the claimant’s attorney if the hearing
is not successful because the hearing record contains enumerated exhibits, all of which
constitute the record on which the decision was made. Thus, filing an appeal is easier
because all of the exhibits and transcripts are available and may be thoroughly examined
for any errors made during the hearing. Id.
35
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 50. Not surprisingly, the sequential evaluation
process is founded on the same public policy argument that supports the Social Security
Act, namely, that if an employee is unable to maintain a minimum level of personal
sustenance, society has deemed it necessary to offer resources so that the employee does
not suffer. Id.
36
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2000) (explaining the requirement that
the claimant is no longer able to work due to health reasons can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less thantwelve months).
37
JASPER, supra note 6, at 41–42 (discussing how the claimant must be first eligible to
apply before the disability determination process starts).
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Once the applicant is deemed eligible, the SSA next determines
whether the applicant is disabled under the five-step sequential
evaluation process.38 The first of the five-step sequential evaluation
process is to determine whether the individual is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (“SGA”).39 If the individual is working and the work
meets the criteria of SGA, then the individual is not disabled and the

38
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006). The ALJ must sequentially follow the five-step evaluation
process. Id. Thus, if the ALJ can find that the claimant is disabled or not disabled by
application of a specific step, the ALJ makes his or her determination or decision and does
not go on to subsequent steps. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4) (2006). As mentioned in note 6, the
concept of disability is subjective, so without an objective standard as to who is determined
to be disabled can vary widely among individuals. See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at
50. The legislature’s solution was “a legal standard which takes into account both medical
and vocational issues, founded on the premises that disability in American society is
grounded in an ability to maintain a minimum level of sustenance through one’s own
efforts.” Id. at 50. See also JASPER, supra note 6, at 43 (stating that “[q]ualifying disabilities
are usually determined by a state agency that handles health issues—generally known as a
disability determination service—which must find that the individual is suffering from a
physical or mental impairment that meets SSA criteria[]”).
39
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(i). Regulations define “substantial gainful activity” as “work that
[] (a) [i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and (b) [i]s
done (or intended) for pay or profit.” Id. § 404.1510 (2006). Thus, the definition of SGA
consists of work activity that is both (1) substantial and (2) gainful. Id. See also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1572 (2006) (stating that substantial work involves doing significant physical and or
mental activities with reasonable regularity, e.g., work cannot be sporadic or transitory,
and also that gainful work is work activity done for pay or profit). This regulation states
that any monthly income below three-hundred dollars does not rise to the level of SGA. Id.
§ 404.1574(b)(3). However, any monthly income that exceeds three-hundred dollars, but is
below seven-hundred and eighty dollars, will prompt a review by the SSA in order to
determine whether the applicant is engaging in SGA. Id. This review process will
determine whether the applicant’s work is comparable to that of unimpaired individuals in
the community doing the same or similar work, including similar time, skills, energy, and
responsibility. See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 64. Then, the review process will
determine whether the work, though significantly less than that done by unimpaired
individuals, worth the amount presumed to be consistent with the SGA amount of sevenhundred and eighty dollars. Id. In other words, the SSA determines whether the
applicant’s monthly income is subsidized because, even though the applicant is working,
the work is at a substandard level and the employer continues to employ the applicant
even though the work product is substandard to that of an average employee. See THOMAS
E. BUSH, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE §113 (2006) (stating that “[w]ork may not be
substantial when a claimant is unable ‘to do ordinary . . . tasks satisfactorily without
more . . . assistance than is usually given other people doing similar work’ or when a
claimant is doing work ‘that involves minimal duties . . . that are of ‘little . . . use’ to the
employer . . . .”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(b)). After 2001, the SSA adopted a policy
declaring that the amount of income that qualifies as gainful activity is adjusted for growth
in national wages. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2)(ii). The average monthly earnings in 2004
were eight-hundred and ten dollars. See BUSH, supra, § 113.
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determination process ceases; however, if the claimant meets the SGA
requirement, then the process continues.40
The second step is to determine whether the individual has an
impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe.41 If the
individual does not have an impairment, or combination of impairments,
that is severe, the SSA finds the individual not disabled, and the
determination process ceases.42
40
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2006). If the claimant is actually working at a certain level of
earnings at the applicable time, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant’s
medical severity. Id. § 404.1520(b). In Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), the
court determined that SGA was employment performed on a regular basis. Id. at 534. The
court further determined that intermittent employment does not necessarily constitute
SGA, and the SSA should review medical testimony to determine if such an intermittent
employee qualifies for disability benefits. Id.
41
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a
combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, the SSA
will find that the disability claimant not disabled. Id. The duration of the impairment
needs to have lasted or expected to last for a continuous period of at leasttwelvemonths.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (2006). The word ‘severe’ is a term of art, and its definition is found
in § 223(d)(3) of the Social Security Act and also in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). There is a twofold process in determining the existence of a severe impairment: (1) A medically
determinable impairment which is (2) more than a slight abnormality and has more than a
minimal effect on the ability to do basic physical or mental work activities. See S.S.R. 96-3p
(July 2, 1996). Medically determinable means the result of anatomical, physiological or
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (2006); see also S.S.R. 96-3p (July
2, 1996) (stating that a severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work-related activities).
The combined effect of all impairments must be assessed without regard to whether any
single impairment, if considered separately, would be severe in determining if a severe
impairment exists. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2006). A severe impairment should be
determined to exist when there are multiple impairments that, considered in combination,
have more than a minimal effect on the ability to perform basic work-related activities. See
S.S.R. 86-8 (Nov. 30, 1985). The issue of tacking arises when there are unrelated severe
impairments that develop sequentially, one following the other or with some overlap, and
at least one impairment must alone meet the duration requirement. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1522(a) (2006). Also, such impairments cannot be combined to meet the duration
requirement, even though the impairments together have met or are expected to last for
twelve months. See S.S.R. 82-52 (Nov. 30, 1981); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b) (2006)
(stating that where severity is established only because concurrent impairments are severe
when considered in combination, i.e., no single impairment is severe in and of itself, the
combination must be expected to persist at a severe level for twelve months in order to
meet the duration requirement).
42
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (2006). The SSA has defined a severe impairment as an
impairment that significantly limits a claimant’s mental or physical ability to perform basic
work activities. Id. “The standard for assessing ‘severity’ at step 2 is medical only.
Vocational factors, such as age, education, and past work history, are considered at this
step, but they are more important at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.” WOLFE &
POSZEK, supra note 8, at 74; see also S.S.R. 96-3p (July 2, 1996) (stating that the ALJ is
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The third step is to determine whether the individual’s impairment
meets the severity of an impairment listed43 in the Social Security
Regulations.44 If it does, the individual is deemed disabled.45 If it does
not, the SSA proceeds to step four, which is to determine whether the
individual’s impairment(s) prevent(s) her from doing her past relevant
required to evaluate a claimant’s impairment to assess the impairment’s effect on the
claimant’s performance of basic work activities and that in situations when the effect of an
impairment on the claimant’s ability to perform work activities is indeterminable, the ALJ
should presume that a severe impairment exists and proceed to step three).
43
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (2006). Appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 is
the body system listing and consists of the following sections: 1.00 Musculoskeletal
System; 2.00 Special Senses and Speech; 3.00 Respiratory System; 4.00 Cardiovascular
System; 5.00 Digestive System; 6.00 Genitourinary Impairments; 7.00 Hematological
Disorders; 8.00 Skin Disorders; 9.00 Endocrine System; 10.00 Impairments That Affect
Multiple Body Systems; 11.00 Neurological; 12.00 Mental Disorders; 13.00 Malignant
Neoplastic Diseases; and 14.00 Immune System. Id. If the DIB claimant’s impairment
meets or equals one of the above listings, then the Agency will halt the process at Step 3
and find that the claimant is disabled. Id.
44
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(iii) (2006). If the disability claimant has an impairment that meets
the duration requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or is the equivalent of a listed
impairment, the SSA will find the claimant disabled without considering the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience Id. § 404.1520(d) (2006). However, if a person has a
severe, medically determinable impairment which, though not meeting or equaling the
criteria in the Listing of Impairments, prevents the person from doing PRW, it must be
determined whether the person can do other work. Id. This involves consideration of the
person’s RFC and the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience. Id. See
generally S.S.R. 85-15 (Nov. 30, 1984) (discussing the transition between steps 3 and step 4).
45
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 91 (discussing the additional step in the five-step
sequential evaluation process). The five-step sequential process arguably has six steps
because before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must establish the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 8 (stating that step four consists of
two determinations). A claimant’s RFC is based on that individual’s physical and mental
limitations and measures how the limitations affect the claimant’s ability to work, and it
serves as an evaluation of what the claimant can still do despite his or her limitations. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (2006). The RFC assessment is used at the fourth step to determine if
the individual can do past relevant work. See id. at §404.1520(e). See also WOLFE & POSZEK,
supra note 8, at 91 (stating that before the analysis under step four can be completed, the
RFC needs to be assigned at “step Three-and-a-Half of the five-step sequential evaluation
process[]”). Establishing the claimant’s RFC is completed by reviewing the claimant’s
medical records and then comparing the claimant’s limitations to one of five categories of
exertion-type work activity located in the DOT. Id. at 92. The five categories are as follows:
(1) Sedentary work; (2) Light work; (3) Medium work; (4) Heavy work; and (5) Very heavy
work. Id. The ALJ gauges the claimant’s ability to engage in various activities, classified as
exertional or non-exertional. Id. at 51. The claimant’s functional capability varies,
depending on the inability to engage in specified exertion-type or non-exertion-type
activities. Id. at 92. “It is this variation, and the absence of a specific capability, or
limitation, that ultimately defines the individual’s capacity for different work categories
. . . .” Id. at 51. Thus, once the claimant is assigned a residual functional capacity, the issue
becomes whether the individual’s employment within the previous fifteen years can still be
completed. Id. at 52.
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work (“PRW”), considering her residual functional capacity (“RFC”).46 If
the individual’s impairment(s) prevent(s) her from doing her PRW, the
SSA proceeds to the last of the five-step process.47
In this last step, the SSA determines whether a significant number of
jobs that the individual is able to perform exists in the national economy,
considering her RFC together with the vocational factors of age,
education, and work experience.48 If a significant number of jobs that the
individual can perform exists in the national economy, the SSA finds that

46
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(1) (2006) (stating that past relevant work is employment that
an individual completed within the past fifteen years, was classified as substantial gainful
activity, and lasted long enough for the individual to learn how to complete the tasks); see
also S.S.R. 82-62 (Nov. 30, 1981) (stating that the employment must have been done for a
sufficient length of time to learn and provide average performance). The Code requires
that if the impairment does not match a listing in the Social Security Regulations, then the
ALJ shall assess and make a finding about the claimant’s residual functional capacity based
on all the relevant medical evidence and other evidence in the claimant’s case record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (2006). The individual’s impairment and any related symptoms, such
as pain, may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what the individual can
accomplish in their employment setting; thus, the RFC is the most an individual can still
accomplish despite their limitations. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). Although the ALJ is responsible
for assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider and evaluate any assessment of
the individual’s RFC by a state agency, or medical, or psychological consultant. See S.S.R.
96-6p (July 2, 1996); see also S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996) (stating that the RFC assessment is
derived from the following medical and non-medical sources: (1) medical history; (2)
medical signs and laboratory findings; (3) treating physician’s reports; (4) the effects of
treatment, including limitations or restrictions imposed by the mechanics of treatment; (5)
reports of daily activities; (5) lay evidence; (6) consultative examination reports; (7) the
claimant’s testimony at the hearing; (8) the opinion from the DDS physician; (9) the effects
of the symptoms, including pain, that is reasonably attributed to a medically determinable
impairment; (10) work evaluations; (11) evidence from attempts to work; and (12) the need
for a structured living environment).
47
See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 173. Only if it is determined that the claimant is
rendered unable to perform previous employment will the question be considered whether
there are other, less-demanding competitive jobs that the individual can perform. Id.
Arguably, the support behind steps four and five comes from a public policy to encourage
individuals who are capable of work to do just that—work. Id. at 52. “[S]ociety should not
have to supply a minimum daily sustenance to an individual who is capable of working at
a competitive level.” Id.
48
See id. at 52 (explaining that once it is determined that the claimant is not able to return
to a past job, the determination of whether there are other jobs that the claimant can
perform must be made). “Whatever criteria may be used in determining whether a
claimant is capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy, it is
generally immaterial that the number of jobs that the claimant can perform is a small
percentage of the total number of jobs in a given region.” 3 SOC. SEC. LAW & PRAC. § 43:137
(Dec. 2007). The term ‘region’ can refer to the number of jobs existing in the entire state.
See Gonzalez v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 773 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(discussing the broadness of the SSA’s definition of regional economy). But see Meeks v.
Apfel, 993 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that the term ‘region’ can refer to the
number of jobs existing in a particular area of the state).
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the individual is not disabled under Social Security Regulations; if a
significant number of jobs that the individual can perform does not exist
in the national economy, then the SSA rules that the individual is
disabled.49
When determining disability, the SSA does not consider whether the
individual filing for DIB would actually be hired if she applied for work;
in other words, factors such as unemployment rates or job availability in
the claimant’s hometown are not considered.50 Instead, the Social
Security Regulations declare that the test for disability takes into account
only the individual’s ability to complete work.51
Thus far, this overview of the five-step sequential process has not
discussed the use of a VE; that is because a VE becomes involved in the
49
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (2006). If the individual can make an adjustment to other
work, then that individual is not disabled under theSocial Security Regulations definition
of disabled. Id. In order for the SSA to meet its burden at the fifth step, the SSA must
demonstrate that the claimant can perform at least a substantial portion of the employment
in the claimant’s assigned residual functional capacity category. See Campbell v. Bowen,
822 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987). The SSA has enacted policies that state that a claimant is
capable of performing other work when the range and kind of work for which the claimant
is functionally and vocationally suited is broad enough that the claimant can be reasonably
expected to make the vocational adjustment. Id. at 1523.
50
Ken Matheny, Social Security Disability and the Older Worker: A Proposal for Reform, 10
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 37, 40 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2002))
(stating that regardless of whether a specific job vacancy exists for the individual, or
whether that individual would be hired if she applied for work, if the jobs exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, then the individual is not disabled); see also
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 52 (suggesting that the question is not whether there
exists actual employment in the regional or national economy, rather, the question is
whether, hypothetically, employment exists in the regional or national economy).
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2000).
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. . . . ‘work which
exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant
numbers ether in the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Id. (citations omitted). See also 3 SOC. SEC. LAW & PRAC, supra note 48, at § 43:137.
[F]or the purpose of determining a claimant’s ability to engage in work
other than past relevant work, work is considered to exist in the
national economy when there [exists] a significant number of jobs, in
one or more occupations, that have requirements that the claimant is
able to meet with her physical or mental abilities and vocational
qualifications.
Id.
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five-step sequential process only during the fourth and fifth steps (and
plays an influential role only at the fifth step).52 Accordingly, this Note
next focuses on the fourth and fifth steps of the five-step sequential
process, and the SSA’s policies regarding VEs and their use of the DOT.
C. The Fourth and Fifth Steps of the Five-Step Sequential Disability
Determination Process: Policy Objectives Regarding Vocational Experts,
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and the Social Security
Administration’s Legal Standards
At the fourth of the five-step sequential disability determination, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) relies on VE testimony on a limited
basis; at the fifth step, however, the SSA relies heavily on testimony from
the VE who forms his or her opinion after reviewing the disability
claimant’s records and data in the DOT.53 This testimony is crucial
because neither the ALJ nor the claimant possess the ability to analyze
the exertion or skill required by particular employment positions,
because the categories in the DOT are organized in an exceedingly
technical fashion.54 Thus, VE testimony serves as the foundational
building block of the SSA disability determination process, because,
without it, a complete, accurate, and reasonable decision would not be
possible.55
52
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1303 (stating that vocational evidence plays a critical role at
only steps four and five of this sequential evaluation process).
53
CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY: LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
FEDERAL COURT 158 (1994). In determining whether a claimant can return to past relevant
work, the ALJ must make a specific finding on that issue. Id. “In evaluating past work, the
ALJ must make findings as to the physical and mental demands of that work, and the
stress of that work.” Id. In complex cases, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to use a
vocational expert to determine the exertional and non-exertional requirements of the
claimant’s past work. Id. at 224. However, the ALJ may not rely upon a vocational expert
in deciding whether the claimant can return to past work. Id. at 223; see also infra note 86
and accompanying text (discussing how the claimant bears the burden of proving that he
or she is unable to perform any past work).
54
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 155 (stating that such knowledge is beyond the
knowledge of the ordinary person, and thus, requires a vocational expert); see also U.S.
Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “U.S. Department of Labor,
Office of Administrative Law Judges, ‘Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed., Rev.
1991)—Appendix
D,’”
available
at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/
REFERENCES/DOTAPPD.HTM.
The DOT will assist in identifying occupational
progression and skill transfers vertically within a technology or horizontally among closely
related technologies. Id. Each occupational definition also provides essential job placement
information by indicating the industry or industries in which a given occupation is found,
and by describing job tasks and task variables. Id.
55
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (2006) (stating that if the issue in determining the individual’s
disability rests upon whether the individual’s work skills can be used in other work and
the specific occupations in which they can be used, or if a similarly complex issue exists,
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The Vocational Expert

A VE is a consultant who specializes in employment placement and
occupational requirements.56 Although a VE is hired by the SSA, a VE is
neither the SSA’s nor the claimant’s witness, but rather renders an
impartial opinion based on evidence presented at a hearing and the
claimant’s assigned RFC.57 Because a VE bases his opinion on prehearing documentation and oral testimony of the claimant and others,
the VE is normally the last witness to testify.58 The VE’s role is to
provide an opinion regarding the skill and exertion levels of various
jobs, the transferability of the claimant’s skills, and the employment
positions that the applicant for disability benefits can or cannot
perform.59
The basis of a VE’s authority is the VE’s credentials.60 Thus, the SSA
holds that an ALJ is authorized to defer to a proposed VE on the ground

the Agency may use a vocational expert); see also Fines v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir.
1998) (stating that the Social Security regulations expect ALJs to consult VEs).
56
See BUSH, supra note 39, § 340. “Vocational experts testify . . . in many more social
security disability hearings than do medical experts; but the experience, knowledge, ability,
understanding of the VE role, and the prejudices of individual VEs vary much more widely
than do the comparable skills and experience of medical experts.” Id.
57
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 155 (discussing how the VE is considered an
independent contractor employed by the SSA); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (stating
that “[t]hough paid for his professional services, the vocational expert is not an agent of the
Social Security Administration[]”); HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, 2 SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND
PROCEDURES 65 (1998) (discussing how the claimant should not make the point that the VE
was selected and being paid by the SSA because the SSA will point out that the VE receives
the same fee no matter what way the VE’s testimony is directed).
58
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1303 (discussing when the VE will normally testify at the
disability hearing). The VE’s observation of the claimant at the hearing might yield
evaluative clues regarding appearance, responsiveness, general intelligence,
communication skills, and other claimant characteristics. Id. Additionally, the VE might
notice the claimant’s physical capacities, such as the use of limbs or physical endurance
during the course of a lengthy hearing. Id. Furthermore, and maybe most importantly, the
VE can also deduce the RFC for work from the claimant’s testimony about everyday
activities. Id.
59
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 224. The VE must “(1) assess the effect of any limitation
on the range of work at issue; (2) advise whether the impaired person’s [residual functional
capacity] permits him or her to perform substantial numbers of occupations within the
range of work at issue; (3) identify jobs which are with the [residual functional capacity], if
they exist[.]” Id. Additionally, the VE is permitted to testify as to whether a claimant has
attained transferable skills in a prior job. Id. at 225.
60
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the vocational
expert’s own expertise establishes the necessary foundation for his or her testimony and
thus no additional foundation is required).
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that the VE has good credentials in a vocational field that is categorized
as atypical and complex.61
The broad deference afforded to a VE is limited by only two
safeguards.62 First, while attempting to strike a balance between fairness
and the implementation of an efficient, informal adjudication process,
courts have held that VE testimony supporting a Social Security
disability proceeding “is not ‘substantial’ if [that] vital testimony has
been conjured out of whole cloth.”63 The other example of a check on
VEs testimony is that if a contradiction exists between the VE’s
testimony and the data contained in the DOT, the ALJ shall make an
inquiry (similar to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 702”)),
to determine whether the VE’s testimony is reliable.64
After a VE testifies and the ALJ asks whether the VE’s testimony is in
accordance with the DOT, if the claimant does not question the VE’s
reasoning (even if that reasoning contradicts the data contained in the
DOT), then the claimant’s right to later question the reasoning is
waived.65 This means that the claimant’s attorney needs to be well-

61
See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad, Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating that if an expert relies upon his or her expert intuition or curriculum vitae, then
that expert’s extrapolations are neither normal among social scientists nor testable, and
conclusions that are not falsifiable are not worth much to the court).
62
See infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing how substantial testimony is
required to support a finding, and that if the testimony is merely hypothesized then it is
not substantial); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/
rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (explaining why and when the ALJ can rely upon a
VE to give testimony at a disability hearing); infra note 130 and accompanying text
(discussing how the ALJ has an obligation to play a gatekeeper role by asking if any
inconsistencies exist between the VE’s testimony and the data contained within the DOT).
63
Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002). Although expert witnesses
must meet the requirements of 702 (that (1) the testimony be based upon sufficient data; (2)
the testimony satisfy the aspects of reliability; and (3) the expert applies the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case), this heightened level of due process protection is
not implemented in Social Security disability hearings which are a hybrid of the adversarial
and the inquisitorial models. Id. The notion that experts should use reliable methods does
not depend upon only Rule 702. Id. Rather, because the Social Security disability process
requires a showing of substantial evidence, there is an appropriate check on the broad
credibility granted to the VE. Id. “Evidence is not ‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been
conjured out of whole cloth”. Id.
64
See Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446; see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1 (stating that
under S.S.R. 00-4p, the Social Security Commissioner states that only reliable job
information available from various publications will be used).
65
Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (stating that if no one questions the vocational expert's
foundation or reasoning, an ALJ is entitled to accept the vocational expert’s conclusion,
even if that conclusion differs from the DOT because the DOT, after all, just records other
unexplained conclusions and is not even subject to cross-examination).
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versed in the intricacies of the DOT and understand the methodologies
used by VEs to form their conclusions.66
On appeal, if a claimant wishes to challenge the VE’s testimony by
arguing that the same claimant did not receive a fair hearing, the
claimant must show that the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole
case, was so extreme as to display clear inability to render a fair
judgment.67 This is a strict requirement to overcome and does not allow
the claimant to attack the reliability of the VE’s testimony; rather, the
claimant is forced to establish that the ALJ’s conduct is of such an
extreme nature that a fair judgment is not possible.68
As mentioned above, the VE’s testimony is based on the oral
testimony of the claimant, the claimant’s RFC for work, and any of the
claimant’s pre-hearing documentation.69 The VE takes into account all of
this information and then places the assigned limitations into categories
within the DOT to determine the types of jobs the claimant is able to
perform.70 Thus, the DOT and the VE’s testimony are intricately linked,
and because the DOT is the main source upon which the VE’s conclusion
is based, familiarity with this reference is essential.71

66
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.1 (discussing how undermining a VE’s credentials
involves confirming whether the VE is a placement specialist and a labor market specialist,
and more importantly, how those experiences provide the necessary competencies to assist
the ALJ in determining the truth).
67
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the standard
that a disability claimant must overcome in order to successfully argue that a fair hearing
was denied).
68
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3. This challenging requirement enacted by the SSA
should be criticized for allowing the poor quality of scientific analyses conducted by many
VEs as well as the SSA’s practice of obscuring its assumptions by disguising policy-based
decisions as scientific ones. Id.
69
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 217. The VE may assess the effect of any exertional or
non-exertional limitations on the range of work at issue (e.g., the potential occupational
base);
advise whether the impaired person’s [residual functional capacity
permits] him or her to perform substantial numbers of occupations
within the range of work at issue; identify jobs which are within the
[residual functional capacity], if they exist; and provide a statement of
the incidence of such jobs in the region in which the person lives or
several regions of the country.
Id. (quoting S.S.R. 83-12 (Nov. 30, 1982)); DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir.
1989).
70
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 225–26 (discussing how a VE needs to know not only
what sort of skills and characteristics that a claimant needs to do a job, but also the
characteristics of the various jobs that exist, which are located in the DOT).
71
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (stating that it is crucial to understand the DOT
because of the SSA’s reliance upon the VE’s testimony which is based in part on data found
in the DOT); see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/
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The Dictionary of Occupational Titles

The DOT is a publication of the U.S. Department of Labor that
provides basic occupational information by classifying jobs into
occupations based on their similarities and also defining the structure
and content of all listed occupations.72 Interestingly, this source was last
modified twenty-five years ago, and the latest edition, the Fourth
Edition, of the DOT was last updated in 1991.73 In addition, the United
States Department of Commerce (U.S. Census Bureau) has replaced the
DOT with the Standard Occupational Classification (“SOC”).74 Because
the DOT is obsolete, a link no longer exists between Census Codes and

rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (providing an example of how significant the DOT is
to the SSA’s adjudication process).
72
See KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 218 (discussing the various aspects and the
information contained within the DOT); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (discussing the
basic contents and data found within the DOT).
73
See U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “United States
Department of Labor Dictionary of Occupational Titles Fourth Edition, Revised 1991,”
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libDOT.htm.
“The DOT was created by the
Employment and Training Administration, and was last updated in 1991. The DOT is
included on the Office of Administrative Law Judges web site because it is a standard
reference in several types of cases adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
especially labor-related immigration cases. The DOT, however, has been replaced by the
O*NET.” Id. (discussing the history of the DOT).
74
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 219. During the early 1980s, the United States
Department of Labor published the Selected Characteristics of the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, as a companion volume to DOT. Id. at 218. Because “[t]he new
version of the DOT does not list the environmental factors present at each job, as Selected
Characteristics did . . . [,]” the SSA permits the use of both for a more complete explanation
of the characteristics of each job. Id. at 219 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d ) (2006)). See also
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1501 (stating that because the DOT does not contain adequate data
to be useful to the Social Security Administration’s adjudication system, the SSA refers to
SCO, as well as other sources of vocational data). The following example illustrates how
the DOT became obsolete and how the SSA could replace the DOT with an updated
occupational source called O*NET:
With the introduction of the Department of Labor’s 1998 database for
analyzing jobs, known as the Occupational Information Network
(O*NET), the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and related
Department of Labor publications including the Selected Characteristics
became obsolete, as did their underlying occupational methodology
and framework. Moreover, with the conversion by the Department of
Labor to the O*NET methodology for analyzing jobs, the Social
Security Administration’s Regulations for adjudicating medicalvocational issues no longer conform to the Department of Labor’s
methodology for analyzing jobs.
Id. § 1503.
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the DOT, which means that no useful source of job information provides
data for the titles in the DOT.75
Furthermore, many jobs listed in the DOT no longer exist and many
jobs that now exist are not yet listed in the archaic DOT.76 Nonetheless, a
VE often attempts to categorize a claimant’s previous work using a ratio
of equivalencies to jobs listed.77 Essentially, a VE must statistically break
down the source data to estimate the number of jobs available in the
appropriate categories of the DOT.78 This is a complicated endeavor, and
if a VE has not received education or training in occupational analysis,
then the VE’s qualifications and testimony lack reliability.79
The claimant additionally faces an uphill battle if the claimant
wishes to challenge the reliability of the DOT because the SSA relies so
heavily on the DOT and both the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential
process are entwined with data found in the DOT.80 To understand the
intricate roles that the VE and the DOT play at the fourth and fifth steps,
it is essential to have a solid understanding of these steps.81
David Traver, A Brief Introduction to U.S. Census Bureau Occupation Codes and the Myth
of Vocational Testimony, CONNECT, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.ssaconnect.com/content/
view/55/175/html. Because there is no longer a link between the Census Codes and the
DOT, the VEs must do something none of them are qualified as Economist to do, namely
break down statistically the source raw data of job counting to project or estimate the
number of jobs in the smaller component categories of the DOT. Id. In the past, VEs
merely took the data from the State governmental departments that used the DOT and
testified that an identified number of jobs existed and could be done by an afflicted
claimant. Id. Under this process, their judgment was vocational in nature and they could
do this with their educational and experienced backgrounds, having placed people in jobs.
Id.
76
See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 149.
77
Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 57, at 62 (citing Pendergraph v. Celebrezze, 255 F.
Supp. 313 (M.D. N.C. 1966)) (stating that too much reliance on the DOT by the VE does not
comply with the substantial evidence rule).
78
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (arguing that if the vocational expert is not
qualified to perform job analysis, or if the vocational expert has not used job analysis
standards that are applicable to the vocational profession, then the testimony should be
rejected).
79
See Traver, supra note 75 (stating that the VE is required to have specialized training
dealing with occupational analysis); see also Solomon, supra note 9, at 210 (stating that
under HALLEX, the VE is first subject to voir dire on his or her qualifications, and then on
the content of his or her testimony); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the
contents and uses of HALLEX).
80
See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2002). Because the DOT is
published by the Department of Labor as a reference tool; it does not purport to contain
rules of law, and no statute or regulation gives it binding force. Id. Thus, there is a need
for the VE to match the facts, i.e., the limitations of the claimant to relevant job data within
the DOT. Id.
81
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1400 (stating that familiarity with and knowledge of the
DOT is essential to disability practice at the SSA because use and reliance upon the DOT
and its progeny are firmly embedded in the SSA’s regulations).
75
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The Fourth of the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination
Process

During the fourth of the five-step sequential disability determination
process, the VE takes the claimant’s assigned RFC for work and matches
it against the job data in the DOT to determine if the claimant can
competitively hold a job that he or she held within the past fifteen
years.82 For the first time in the sequential process, the claimant’s RFC
for work is measured according to actual work previously performed.83
This is also the first time when the full public policy underlying the
disability program is tested: given the client’s RFC for work, can she or
he actually engage in competitive work?84 If it is determined that the
claimant is able to perform past relevant work, then the process stops
there and the claimant is found not disabled.85 If the claimant reaches
the fifth step, the burden shifts to the SSA86 to demonstrate that reference
to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”)87 dictates that either
82
20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 (2006). The fifteen-year standard is meant to protect the claimant
from having remote jobs considered against him or her because it is no longer realistic to
expect that skills and abilities learned in that job are relevant, let alone honed. See id.
83
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 220 (citing S.S.R. 85-15 (Nov. 30, 1984)). A VE is
permitted to testify in cases in which the issue is whether the claimant can make a
vocational adjustment to a new job, considering his or her remaining occupational base (as
a result of reduced residual functional capacity) with his or her age, education, and past
work experience. Id.
84
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 147 (discussing the importance of past relevant
work).
85
See Larry M. Gropman, Social Security, 1996 DET. C.L. REV. 517, 525 (1996) (stating that
it is important to note that the fifteen-year standard does not apply to unskilled jobs
because such work does not entail complex cognitive demands and can be learned after
brief training); see also Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating that if it is determined that the claimant can perform his or her past relevant
work, a finding of not disabled is rendered and there is no need for testimony from a
vocational expert because the sequential process stops there).
86
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216. To meet this burden, the ALJ must support the
finding with substantial evidence that the claimant has the vocational qualifications to
perform specific jobs. See O’Banner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 587 F.2d 321, 323
(6th Cir. 1978). The burden of proof rests upon the claimant throughout the first four steps.
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 169. The disability claimant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence each of the requirements necessary to keep advancing
through the sequential evaluation process. Id. Thus, at the fourth step the claimant must
demonstrate that she can no longer perform her past work. Id.
87
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216. The Medical-Vocation Guidelines represent
outcome-determinative assumptions. WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 177. “If a specific
set of conditions exists, considering a variety of factors, the law presumes that the claimant
is or is not disabled.” Id. “In each Grid rule are discrete factors that must be determined in
order to properly apply the rules.” Id. To illustrate, if the “claimant was found to be
limited to sedentary work, was fifty-five years of age, [and] was a high school graduate,
but . . . [the claimant’s] education did not otherwise provide for direct entry into skilled
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the claimant is able to perform other substantial gainful employment88 or
that a significant number of jobs that the claimant is able to perform is
available in the national economy.89
work, and . . . [the claimant’s] skills were not transferable[]” under Grid rule 201.06, the
claimant would be deemed disabled. Id. The RFC assigned by the ALJ to the claimant
determines which table of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines is to be used: Table One
applies to individuals whose RFC limits them to sedentary work; Table Two applies to
individuals whose RFC limits them to light work; and Table Three to those limited to
medium work. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpart P App. 2 (2006). Interestingly, no tables exist
for claimants able to perform heavy or very heavy work, probably because the Guidelines
state that regardless of the claimant’s age, education, or work experience, sufficient jobs
exist in the national economy for claimaint’s whose RFCs indicate that they are capable of
achieving substantial gainful activity. Id. On the other extreme, if a claimant is found to be
unable to perform work at even a sedentary level, the claimant will be presumed to be
disabled, absent specific evidence to the contrary. Id.
88
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216. If the claimant’s vocational factors and assigned
RFC coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, that Grid rule dictates a finding of
either disabled or not disabled. See Gropman, supra note 7, at 527. If the claimant matches
one of the Grid rules, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines provide substantial evidence that
the claimant is capable of performing gainful work in the national economy. Id. at 528. In
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines suggesting that the Grids provide the SSA with a shortcut that make the process
more efficient and eliminate the need for calling vocational experts. Id. However, the
Court warned that the Grids are applicable only when the claimant’s RFC or relevant
vocational factors match exactly those reflected in the particular Grid rule. Id.; see also
S.S.R. 83-14 (Nov. 30, 1982) (stating that no Grid rule mandates a conclusion of ‘Disabled’
or ‘Not Disabled’ where a claimant has a non-exertional limitation or restriction imposed
by a medically determinable impairment).
89
See Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the claimant has the
burden of proving disability under the first four steps); see also Savage v. Barnhart, 372 F.
Supp. 2d 922, 927 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that if the claimant is successful in carrying her
burden through the first four steps, the burden shifts to the SSA at step five to show that
other substantial gainful employment, which the claimant is capable of performing, is
available in the national economy); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006) (stating that if the SSA is
able to verify that other employment exists in significant numbers in the national
economy—employment that the disability benefits claimant is capable of performing in
spite of his or her existing impairments—the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove
that he or she is unable to perform the alternative work described). In Barnhart v. Thomas,
the Court addressed whether an applicant for disability benefits under the SSA could
qualify as disabled if he or she can perform his or her previous job, even if that job
disappeared from the economy. 540 U.S. 20, 21 (2003). The claimant (Thomas) who had
previously worked as an elevator operator applied for disability benefits and was
subsequently denied benefits because her impairments did not prevent her from
performing her previous work. Id. at 22. Although the claimant argued that her job had
largely disappeared from the national economy, the ALJ did not find the disappearance of
her job to be relevant. Id. The Court interpreted the statute as creating two separate
requirements for disability—that an applicant must be unable to do her previous work and
that she must be unable to find any substantial work which exists in the national economy.
Id. at 24. The issue arose that although, by the terms of the statute, substantial gainful work
must exist in the national economy it is not clear whether previous work must also exist in
the national economy. Id. at 28. The Court noted that the SSA, through its regulations, had
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The Fifth of the Five-Step Sequential Disability Determination
Process

The main function of the fifth of the five-step sequential disability
determination process is for the SSA to prove that the claimant is able to
perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers; one method of
demonstrating that a significant number of jobs exist in the national
economy is through the use of the Grids.90 The Grids cannot be applied
to claimants who have non-exertion characteristics because the Grids
were constructed to apply only to claimants’ exertional abilities.91 Thus,
if the Grids are not applicable, because either the Grids cannot be
applied or because the claimant’s RFC or relevant vocational factors are
different from those reflected in a particular grid rule, the SSA must use
other means of proving that jobs exist that the claimant can perform.92
The most common way to prove that jobs exist is through the use of the
testimony of the VE.93 The ALJ directs questions to the VE that
interpreted the statute to reject such a requirement and that the five-step process
promulgated by the SSA, defers the inquiry into the state of jobs in the national economy
until the fifth step. Id. The Court held SSA’s interpretation of the statute was correct and
that the lower court erred by ignoring canons of grammatical construction which indicated
that the qualifying phrase that exists in the national economy should only apply to
substantial gainful work. Id. The Court reasoned that consideration of the claimant’s
previous employment may function as a proxy for an analysis of employment existing
throughout the economy, regardless of whether a previous job exists in the economy. Id.
The Court justified its reasoning by stating that such an interpretation allows the SSA to
avoid the burden of analyzing applications individually. Id. at 29.
90
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 216 (discussing an overview of vocational evidence
within the sequential evaluation process).
91
See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 178. The Grid rules consider the following
factors: (1) the claimant’s age; (2) the claimant’s educational attainment; (3) the claimant’s
skill level, e.g., past work experience; and (4) the claimant’s exertional level. Id. “Each
factor represents a sliding scale of possibilities, and each possibility has the potential to
dramatically affect the outcome shown by the Grid rule.” Id.
92
KUBITSCHEK, supra note 53, at 217. If the Grids are deemed inapplicable, “then the
courts have uniformly held that Social Security Administration must use other means of
proving that other jobs exist in the national economy which the claimant can perform.” Id.
(citing Buck v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1989)).
93
Solomon, supra note 9, at 209. In order for reliance on the vocational expert’s opinion
to be justified, the ALJ must pose the hypothetical question so that it incorporates and fully
sets forth the claimant’s impairments. See Totz v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citing Shelltrack v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Hinchey v. Shalala,
29 F.3d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that when a hypothetical question does not
encompass all relevant impairments, VE testimony does not constitute substantial evidence
to support the ALJ’s decision). The ALJ will ask the VE to assume certain facts, such as the
existence of a hypothetical individual who is the same age as the claimant and has the same
educational and occupational history. See WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 52. After
laying this foundation, the ALJ poses a set of limitations, asking whether, given these
limitations, there is other less-demanding employment that the individual can perform. Id.
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incorporate hypothetical situations. The ALJ’s hypothetical questions
presume that the facts presented in the claimant’s case are true.94 The
hypothetical questions start with the least restrictive RFC for work, and
subsequently, the ALJ adds new limitations to each additional
hypothetical question.95
In Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2005), the claimant’s impairments were only
mental. Id. The ALJ assigned an RFC with only non-exertional limitations, and relied on
VE testimony to find that the claimant could perform some 16,000 jobs in the region and
thus was not disabled. Id. at 469. The court affirmed, stating that the ALJ properly
considered VE testimony where non-exertional limitations substantially limited the range
of work that the claimant could perform. Id. at 468. The claimant had argued that the ALJ
was not permitted to deny benefits based on the VE’s testimony because the claimant
would be disabled under the Grid rules if limited to sedentary work and because the
number of jobs that the VE identified was less than the total number of sedentary unskilled
jobs. Id. at 469. Under these circumstances, the claimant asserted that the Social Security
regulations required the ALJ to find the claimant disabled using the Grids as a framework.
Id. The court held that the claimant’s argument conflicted with the common-sense rule that
where the Grids do not address a particular problem, the ALJ is entitled to rely on the
expert testimony of a VE. Id. at 472. This outcome means that the Grids do not apply as a
framework at all when a claimant has solely non-exertional limitations. Id.
94
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 193. During the first four steps, the claimant has the
burden of proving his or her disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A) (2000) (stating that the claimant will not be considered to possess a disability
unless the claimant furnishes such medical and other evidence to the SSA). Nevertheless,
jurisprudence makes clear that upon proof by a claimant that he or she cannot perform
prior work, e.g., that the claimant has satisfied step four, the burden shifts to the SSA to
prove that the claimant can perform other work available in the national economy. Bloch
et al., supra note 32, at 1; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987). In Yuckert, the
Court determined that Congress conferred on the SSA Commissioner exceptionally broad
authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the Act. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
at 146 (citing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (quoting Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, (1981))). The Yuckert Court also determined that the SSA
authorizes the Commissioner to adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to
regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proof and evidence and the method of
taking and furnishing the same in disability cases. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)). The
Yuckert Court then pointed out that where the statute expressly entrusts the Commissioner
with the responsibility of implementing a provision by regulation, review is limited to
determining whether the regulations promulgated exceeded the Commissioner’s statutory
authority and whether they are arbitrary and capricious. Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983)).
95
WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 193. The ALJ’s first hypothetical question is
normally the least restrictive RFC, followed by the second hypothetical which builds on the
first, using the original limitations as a foundation on which new, more restrictive
limitations are layered. Id. at 192. The third hypothetical is the most restrictive RFC. Id.
An example of the sequential nature of these hypothetical questions is as follows: (1) a
light RFC (frequently lift ten pounds, occasionally twenty pounds); then (2) a light RFC
with sit-stand option (sit thirty minutes; stand thirty minutes); and then (3) a light RFC,
with sit-stand option and the need to lie down two times each day (in the morning and
afternoon because of drowsiness from medication side effects). Id. “This layered effect
allows both the judge and the representative to clearly delineate the claimant’s restrictions,
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In this fifth step, the VE plays his or her most significant role in the
disability determination process.96 The VE testifies regarding whether,
using the claimant’s RFC and the ALJ’s hypothetical limitations, in
comparison with employment data taken from the DOT, the claimant
can perform other work that exists in significant numbers within the
national economy.97 Essentially, the VE’s testimony—which supports a
finding that in view of the claimant’s age, education, and work
experience other work exists or does not exist in the national economy—
is based on data from the DOT.98

and further allows the representative to monitor the limitations the judge is considering.”
Id. at 193. An example of the typical structure of an ALJ hypothetical question at the least
restrictive level is as follows:
Given your opinion that the claimant cannot return to past work,
assume with me the existence of an individual the same age as the
claimant, with the same vocational history and education. Now
assume that this person can only lift fifteen pounds at a time, cannot sit
longer than one hour at a time before having to stand; cannot stand for
more than thirty minutes at a time before having to sit, and, because of
asthma cannot be exposed to dust, gases, fumes, or odors. Are there
other, less demanding jobs that this individual can perform?
Id. at 190.
96
See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that in social
security disability cases, the ALJ may depend on the VE’s testimony to find the claimant
disabled or not disabled); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1 (stating that “the SSA’s
disability adjudication framework is founded on the DOT and the supporting assumptions,
research, data, and vocational theories (or lack thereof)[]”).
97
See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the antiquity of the DOT); see also
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1500 (discussing how the vocational expert’s testimony is based on
information from the DOT and other labor statistic sources). See also WOLFE & POSZEK,
supra note 8, at 149. Because the DOT has not been updated in many years, job descriptions
have changed and many jobs now exist that are not described in the DOT. Id.
Nevertheless, a VE will often attempt to categorize a claimant’s previous work using
equivalencies to jobs that are listed. Id. “The danger, of course, is that without specific
testimony about actual work duties, the client may be held to the standard of the
‘approximated’ DOT entry, which may or may not reflect the work actually done on the
job.” Id.
98
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (2006) (stating that the Agency relies on the DOT, published
by the Department of Labor); see also Lynn Martin, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of
Administrative Law Judges, “Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed., Rev. 1991)–
Message From The Secretary,” available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/DOT/
REFERENCES/DOTMESS.HTM (stating that “[s]ince its inception, the . . . DOT has
provided basic occupational information to many and varied users in both public and
private sectors of the United States economy[]”); WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 149
(stating that the vocational expert renders an opinion that includes several components,
mostly through reliance on the DOT, including the following: (1) the job title, with
appropriate reference to the job listing set forth in the DOT; (2) the exertional level required
by the job (whether the job requires sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy); and
(3) the skills associated with performing the job).
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The claimant is assured that the SSA relies on reliable job
information available from various publications, including the DOT and
other documents, as provided by the regulations.99 Thus, as determined
by the ALJ after relying on the testimony of the VE, the claimant is
entitled to DIB only if a significant number of jobs that he or she is able
to perform is not available in the national economy.100
Section 405(g) of the SSA allows unsuccessful claimants to seek
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.101 However, the scope of judicial
review in such cases is limited because the SSA’s denial of benefits is not
to be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence and contains no
legal error.102 In regard to Social Security disability proceedings,
substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than
a preponderance.”103 Indeed, the ALJ’s resolution of evidentiary
conflicts requires such deference.104
Considering the high level of deference given to the SSA with regard
to evidentiary matters, and the relatively broad credibility granted to VE
testimony, questions of reliability and fairness are bound to arise in
Social Security disability proceedings.105 The lack of concrete standards
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.2 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d ) (2006)).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2006); see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at, 173 (discussing
the only two steps at which a claimant can be granted benefits: step-three (the medical
listings) and step-five (the step in which the claimant’s RFC determines whether there are
other less-demanding jobs that can be performed, or, if not, whether benefits will be
granted)).
101
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (setting forth the requirements claimants must meet in
order to challenge the ALJ’s determination); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing the challenging obstacles the claimant must overcome in order to be successful
in arguing that she was not afforded a fair hearing).
102
See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that when the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation,
deference must be given to the ALJ’s conclusion); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[i]f the evidence can support either outcome, the
[reviewing] court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ[]”) (quoting Sousa v.
Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). But see Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,
501 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Appeals Council’s decision cannot be affirmed simply
by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence). Rather, a court must “consider
the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts
from the [SSA] Secretary’s conclusion.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993);
see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the record as a
whole must be considered).
103
Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v.
Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding substantial evidence in the record
despite ALJ’s failure to discuss every piece of evidence).
104
See Lewis, 236 F.3d. at 509 (stating that deference must be given to the ALJ’s credibility
determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts).
105
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (stating
that the vocational expert’s own expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her
99

100
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regulating the methodology used by VEs is the key factor undermining
the integrity of the five-step sequential disability determination
process.106 For this reason, the next section addresses the progression of
evidentiary standards as they apply to expert witnesses, as well as the
SSA’s attempt to curb the broad credibility granted to VEs.107
D. Evidence:
Policies

Pre- and Post-Daubert Standards and Post-Daubert SSA

Because the VE testifies at the disability hearing and that testimony
is used by the ALJ to determine whether a claimant is disabled, a
standard is needed to define the specific requirements that the VE’s
testimony and the VE’s methodology must satisfy in order to maintain
the integrity of the VE’s testimony.108 The most well-known example of
a standard that places a check on the testimony of an expert is Rule 702,
but before the adoption of Rule 702, American courts relied on the Frye
standard.109
testimony and no other foundation is required); see also Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d
403, 408 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that vocational expert testimony without a foundation is not
substantial evidence in a disability hearing). But see Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that even though Rule 702 does not apply, the vocational expert’s
testimony must still be based upon substantial evidence because vital testimony is not
substantial if it is conjured out of “whole cloth”).
106
See Traver, supra note 75. At the fifth step, the ALJ calls on the testimony of a
vocational expert, and the testimony from these experts is based on the DOT. Id.
Astonishingly, when the vocational expert reaches the stage of testimony regarding
particular jobs and the number of jobs in the regional economy, some experts may be
inclined to hypothesize about data. Id. Because data sources are no longer tracked to the
DOT and a statistical evaluation is now necessary, the VEs who are trained and qualified to
understand employment and job placement, do not have the appropriate preparation to
manipulate job data to identify components of job groups provided by the DOT. Id. Thus,
the VE’s methodology is outside the parameters of their training. Id. When the VE gives
the based upon my experience answer, the VE should be able to back thatanswer up with
explanations that support the testimony. Id. In the absence of that foundation, the
testimony is simple ipse dixit. Id. See also TRAVER, supra note 2, §1900.4 (stating that
“attacking the VE’s credentials involves confirming whether the VE is a placement
specialist and a labor market specialist, and more importantly, how those experiences
provide the necessary competencies to assist the ALJ in the adjudicative process[]”).
107
See infra notes 108–39 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary standards as
they apply to experts and the SSA’s attempt to put a check on the broad credibility granted
to VEs, thereby ensuring that claimants are afforded an adequate level of fairness).
108
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how the SSA created the role of the VE to
dispassionately contribute his or her vocational evidence toward reaching an equitable
decision).
109
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defense offered a
scientist as an expert to testify that the result of a blood pressure deception test, conducted
on the defendant before the trial, proved that the defendant was innocent. Id. at 1013–14.
The court held that the testimony resulting from the test, which the defense hoped to
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Pre-Daubert: Frye v. United States

Before implementation of Rule 702,110 the Frye general acceptance
standard was the established standard for determining the admissibility
of expert testimony.111 This standard required testimony from experts in
relatively novel scientific fields to be closely scrutinized and ultimately
ruled inadmissible if the expert’s conclusions had not yet gained
scientific recognition among other experts in the novel scientific field.112
2.

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

In 1983, Daubert incorporated into evidentiary jurisprudence the
notion that judges act as gatekeepers; this required a judge to determine
whether a proffered expert opinion is both relevant and reliable to the
issue being sought for admission.113 Daubert established that federal

admit, had not yet achieved standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities and thus was inadmissible. Id. at 1014.
110
See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that an expert witness may testify when the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and the witness has applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case in
a reliable manner); see also 33A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 80:213 (stating that although Rule 702
does not require absolute certainty of a result for the admissibility of expert testimony, the
gatekeepers must find that the testimony is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and free
from speculation).
111
Frye, 293 F. at 1013 (stating that originally the general rule was that the opinions of
experts were admissible as evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry was such
that inexperienced persons were unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment
on those opinions).
112
See id. at 1014 (stating that if the question involved does not lie within the range of
common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to
which the question relates are admissible in evidence).
113
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the
Court considered whether the Frye test had been superseded by of Rule 702. Id. The
plaintiffs sued Merrill Dow, alleging that birth defects suffered by their children resulted
from the ingestion of the drug Bendectin while the mothers were pregnant. Id. at 582.
Merrill Dow sought summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not
present any admissible evidence to prove Bendectin caused the alleged birth defects. Id.
Because the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ testimonies—that the drug could cause birth
defects—were based on animal studies, the defendant’s expert testified that no study had
linked the drug to birth defects in humans. Id. at 582. Merrill Dow argued that the
abandonment of Frye’s general acceptance standard would result in confused juries not
capable of understanding absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. Id. at 595–96.
The Court realized that Rule 702 granted expert witnesses wide latitude to express
opinions not afforded to ordinary witnesses. Id. at 592. However, the Court held that
intense cross examination, offering conflicting evidence and proper jury instructions,
would be an effective method of attacking questionable, but admissible, evidence. Id. at
596.
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judges cannot merely defer to a proposed expert on the ground that the
expert has good credentials in a field that is atypical or complex.114 Any
prospective expert evidence that is not both reliable and relevant must be
excluded by the gatekeeper because it is speculation rather than
knowledge.115
Eventually, the Supreme Court expanded Daubert by declaring that
gatekeepers must ensure that any and all scientific testimony is not only
relevant, but reliable, and gatekeepers must apply this rule equally to all
expert testimony.116 Under Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, courts are
expected to filter the good science from the bad science and thus ensure
that the proposed expert testimony is supported by appropriate
validation.117

See Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, AMER. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH, July 2005, S60 (stating that before Daubert, courts normally deferred to the various
fields of experts); see also Paul S. Miller and Bert W. Rein, “Gatekeeping” Agency Reliance on
Scientific and Technical Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the
Administrative Process, 17 TOURO L. REV. 297, 303 (2000) (stating that “[n]o longer may a
federal judge simply ‘defer’ to a proposed expert on the ground that he or she has good
credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult[]”). See also Stewart Lee, Comment,
Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Daubert Applies to All Expert Testimony, 69 MISS. L.J. 979 (1999).
Lee discusses the application of the Daubert standard to all experts:
Regarding reliability, the [Daubert] Court identified four factors that
the district courts might find helpful in assessing the reliability of a
particular scientific theory or technique as follows: (1) whether the
theory can be . . . tested, (2) whether the theory has been subjected to
peer review and publication, (3) whether the theory has a high known
or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling
the technique’s operation and (4) whether the technique enjoys general
acceptance within a relevant scientific community.
Id. at 984–86 (citation quotations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
115
Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 303. The authors continue by stating “that, ‘[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact,’ an expert
‘may testify thereto[]’ . . . .” Id. at 299 (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). See also Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory
Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert
Principles Into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003). The authors state
that Daubert demands that ‘good science’ be fostered in court proceedings and that expert
testimony which is not grounded in scientific methods and procedures be rejected. Id.
“Federal agencies . . . have been widely criticized for lacking a commitment to sound
science. Too often, federal courts have upheld agency decisions that are based on faulty
scientific evidence or unsupported assumptions and conclusions.” Id. See also E. Donald
Elliott, Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125, 10126
(2001) (stating that the harms of junk science within agency proceedings demand the
implementation of a Daubert-style standard).
116
Miller and Rein, supra note 114, at 299 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. 579; Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (citation omitted)).
117
526 U.S. 137 (1999). See Mason, supra note 1, at 892 (stating that gatekeepers are
expected to separate bad science from good science, i.e., separate the recognized science
114
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Why the Daubert Standard Does Not Apply in Social Security
Disability Hearings

In Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court considered whether the
requirements of expert testimony as outlined in Rule 702 applied to
experts testifying at Social Security disability hearings.118 In Richardson,
the Court determined that Rule 702 and its requirements do not govern
the admissibility of evidence in disability hearings.119 Furthermore,
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(c), it is clear that Rule
702, and thus Daubert’s interpretation of Rule 702 criteria, does not apply
to the admission of evidence in Social Security disability hearings.120 As
mentioned above, the reason for this approach is described by the
Richardson Court: the “strict rules of evidence, applicable in the
courtroom, are not to operate at social security hearings so as to bar the
admission of evidence otherwise pertinent[.]”121 The Richardson Court
held that evidence that would be inadmissible in a court proceeding
from the unrecognized science, and that by doing so, a standard of evidentiary reliability
may be established).
118
402 U.S. 389 (1971). In Richardson, the Court held that a written report by a medical
doctor who examined the claimant and who extrapolated his findings which were limited
to his area of competence was admissible at the disability hearing, despite its hearsay
character. Id. at 402. The Court held that even though the claimant did not have an
opportunity to cross examine the doctor about his findings, the doctor’s report may
constitute substantial evidence supportive of the ALJ’s decision against granting benefits to
the claimant. Id. The Court determined that Congress had granted the Social Security
Commissioner full power and authority to make regulations and to establish procedures
necessary to carry out the regulations, and required the Social Security Commissioner to
adopt reasonable and proper regulations to provide for the nature and extent of the proofs
and evidence. Id. at 399–400. The Court reasoned that the medical report which adversely
affected the claimant being granted disability benefits was admissible because four other
medical doctors had participated and had arrived at a similar conclusion. Id. at 404. Thus,
the Court reasoned that the claimant’s due process rights were in no way infringed because
there were no inconsistencies in the reports of the five specialists. Id.
119
Id. at 399; see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). In Bayliss, the
court ruled that a foundation for a VE’s testimony was not required. 427 F.3d at 1211. The
ALJ’s reliance on VE testimony regarding the number of relevant jobs in the national
economy was warranted because the ALJ may take administrative notice of any reliable job
information, including information provided by the VE. Id. at 1218.
120
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (2000). During a hearing, investigation, or other proceeding,
the SSA Commissioner may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and
receive evidence. See id. Evidence may be received at any hearing before the
Commissioner of Social Security even though it may be inadmissible under rules of
evidence applicable to court procedure. See id.
121
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. The Court reasoned that administrative procedures should
be understandable to the ordinary claimant and should not be strict in tone and operation.
Id. The Court qualified the previous statement by stating that although “[t]his is the
obvious intent of Congress[,] [it is the case only] so long as the procedures are
fundamentally fair.” Id. at 401.
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could nonetheless constitute substantial evidence supporting a Social
Security disability determination.122 The Court reasoned that with
regard to Social Security disability proceedings, “[t]here emerges an
emphasis upon the informal rather than the formal.”123
The Richardson Court emphasized that the Social Security disability
proceeding should be comprehensible to a layman claimant and that the
proceeding “should be liberal and not strict in tone and operation.”124
This informal evidentiary approach continued as Daubert’s interpretation
of Rule 702 and Daubert criteria was used in traditional courtrooms and
federal agency hearings.125
Additionally, in Social Security disability proceedings, unlike in
traditional proceedings, the VE’s recognized expertise provides the
necessary foundation for his or her testimony; no other requirements
exist to establish additional foundation for the testimony.126 Because
Id. at 400. In dissent, Justice Douglas stated that “Congress provided in the [SSA] that
‘[e]vidence may be received at any hearing before the Secretary even though inadmissible
under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure,’ Congress also provided that
findings of the Secretary were to be conclusive only ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’”
Id. at 412–13 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice Douglas pointed
out that “[u]ncorroborated hearsay untested by cross-examination does not by itself
constitute ‘substantial evidence.’” Id. at 413 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 230 (1938)). The reason for this was because when a claimant
testifies as to the nature and extent of his injury and his family doctor
testifies in his behalf supporting the fact of his disability, the Secretary
should not be able to support an adverse determination on the basis of
medical reports from doctors who did not testify or the testimony of an
HEW employee who never even examined the claimant as a patient.
Id. In an attempt to ensure that disability claimants are afforded an adequate level of
fairness, Justice Douglas pointed out that “[o]ne doctor whose word cast this claimant into
limbo never saw him, never examined him, never took his vital statistics or saw him try to
walk or bend or lift weights.” Id.
123
Id. at 400; see also WOLFE & POSZEK, supra note 8, at 244 (stating that although judicial
hearings are strict in form and process, this is not the case for proceedings before ALJs in
Social Security Disability appeals, because in an attempt to maintain a user-friendly
atmosphere, the SSA has not promulgated formal rules of proceeding in such hearings).
124
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01. The Court continued by determining that it was
Congress’s intent that the Social Security proceedings be informal as long as the hearings
were fundamentally fair. Id.
125
See id. (explaining that although the formal rules of evidence are not applicable
because the layman claimant should not be prejudiced by strict guidelines, this does not
mean that the SSA can permit evidence which is not reliable). See also WOLFE & POSZEK,
supra note 8, at 103. Because the formal rules of evidences are not applicable at disability
hearings, a concern exists regarding the quality and validity of evidence stemming from
the absence of a standard that sets forth which evidence is acceptable. Id.
126
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). In Bayliss, the claimant
argued that the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony was an error because the evidence of
the number of relevant jobs in the national economy was not grounded. Id. The claimant
argued that requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules
122
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Daubert and Rule 702 do not apply to Social Security disability hearings,
the SSA correspondingly enacted only a minimal standard for VE
testimony, so as to afford the claimant a fair and just hearing.127
5.

Social Security Administration Policies

In response to mounting concerns about the reliability of VE
testimony, the SSA enacted S.S.R. 00-4p as an administrative check on
the broad credibility granted to VEs.128 S.S.R. 00-4p is essentially an
administrative or “regulatory Daubert” check on the broad credibility
granted to vocational experts.129 Under this Ruling, the ALJ is required

of Evidence Rule 702, which were established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), do not apply because Rule 702 is inapplicable to SSA proceedings,
and also because Daubert standards were developed under Rule 702 and therefore do not
govern the admissibility of evidence before an ALJ in SSA proceedings. Id. The court held
that an ALJ may take administrative notice of any reliable job information, including
information provided by a VE because the VE’s recognized expertise provides the
necessary foundation for his testimony. Id. “Thus, no additional foundation is required.”
Id. But see Miller, supra note 114, at 303 (stating that after Daubert “[n]o longer may a
federal judge simply ‘defer’ to a proposed expert on the ground that he or she has good
credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult[]”).
127
See generally, S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/
di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p). See also D.
HiepTruong, Daubert and Judicial Review: How Does An Administrative Agency Distinguish
Valid Science from Junk Science?, 33 AKRON L. REV. 365 (2000) (stating that with the
implementation of a Daubert-type standard, Congress would not be second-guessing the
SSA’s decision making, but rather merely ensuring that the evidence relied upon by the
agency meets the same threshold requirements to which a federal litigant is already
subject).
128
See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/
SSR2000-04-di-02.html. Because questions have arisen about how the SSA ensures that
conflicts between data contained in the DOT and testimony proffered by the VE are
resolved, the SSA enacted S.S.R. 00-4p to clarify its standards for identifying and resolving
conflicts. Id. This policy enactment requires the ALJ to identify and obtain a reasonable
explanation for conflicts between VE testimony and data contained in the DOT and other
vocational sources used by the VE. Id. Furthermore, the ALJ must explain how any
conflict was resolved. Id.
129
See Kelly, supra note 12, at 471 (stating that some have called for federal agencies to
implement some form of regulatory Daubert, basically calling for a standard to examine,
test, or question evidence upon which federal administrative agencies rely); see also
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (stating that the SSA is permitted to formulate
rules without being burdened by formal rulemaking because the SSA’s complexity, the vast
number of claimants that it engenders, and the resulting need for agency expertise and
administrative experience indicate the need for a considerable amount of authority to
interpret, matters of detail related to the Agency); Miller, supra note 114, at 298 (stating that
generally courts, when reviewing agency actions, defer to agency expertise on scientific
and technical issues and affirm the agency so long as the administrative record contains
some support for the agency’s conclusions and the agency addressed any conflicting issues
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to act as a gatekeeper by inquiring whether the VE’s testimony adheres
to data found in the DOT.130 Although the SSA only recently enacted
S.S.R. 00-4p, the ruling has already been eroded by courts.131
The erosion continues to occur because courts are divided as to
whether the failure to inquire into DOT inconsistencies entitles claimants
to relief.132 In other words, if the ALJ fails to fulfill their gatekeeping
duty as mandated by S.S.R. 00-4p, the question arises as to whether that
failure constitutes a reversible error.133

raised during the proceedings); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing a model Social Security Ruling
applicable to VEs).
130
See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the function and applicability of S.S.R. 00-4p); see also
supra note 128 (discussing the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p).
131
See infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing how safeguards that ensure
fairness have been subsequently eroded). For example, in Morales v. Barnhart, the district
court found that the ALJ did not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p, but that the ALJ’s failure to
comply with this Ruling did not mandate either a reversal or remand of the decision and
that the court may affirm the ALJ’s decision if it was supported by substantial evidence.
Morales v. Barnhart, No. 06cv0884, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 7421, at *11 (9th Cir. Jan. 17,
2007). In Morales, the claimant argued that several of the jobs described and testified to by
the VE were inconsistent with the DOT. Id. at *12. The SSA did not dispute Morales’s
argument, but argued that the VE’s testimony was not entirely inconsistent with the DOT.
Id. The SSA specifically asserted that even though the jobs of a storage clerk and a
furniture rental consultant are not limited to simple, repetitive tasks, the jobs of a counter
clerk are so limited, and thus there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Id.
at 13. The court held that “although the ALJ did not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p, there is
substantial evidence to support his decision that Plaintiff is not disabled.” Id. at 14. See also
Renfrow v. Astru, 496 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the ALJ’s error in failing to ask
the vocational expert whether his testimony regarding the available jobs in the economy
was consistent with the DOT was harmless); Williams v. Barnhart, 424 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800
(E.D. Penn. 2006) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir. 2006)) (stating
that although some inconsistencies existed between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the
inconsistencies were not present regarding all jobs that the VE listed); Brown v. Barnhart,
408 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that because at least one of the three jobs
described by the VE was consistent with the DOT and existed in significant numbers in the
national economy, the ALJ did not error by failing to ask if any conflicts existed, and thus
this failure to abide by S.S.R. 00-4p did not warrant a reversal). However, other courts
have ruled that the ALJ’s failure to comply with S.S.R. 00-4p is not harmless error. For
example in Lancaster v. Comm’r of Social Security, the court held that the failure of the ALJ to
examine the VE’s proffered testimony was not a harmless error because the VE’s testimony
was unreliable and inconsistencies existed between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. 228
F. App’x 563, 577 (2007). In Lancaster, the court decided that two mistakes—the
inconsistencies with the VE’s testimony and the undermining of the treating physician’s
medical opinion—amounted to serious error. Id.
132
See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the three avenues courts have
taken in interpreting S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000)).
133
See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing the function and applicability of S.S.R. 00-4p).
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Courts have taken three avenues: first, some courts have ruled that
the ALJ’s failure to fulfill the gatekeeping role by S.S.R. 00-4p does not
constitute a reversible error; second, other courts have held that failure to
comply with S.S.R. 00-4p constitutes a reversible error; third, other courts
have taken a middle ground approach by holding that whether failure to
follow the mandate of S.S.R. 00-4p constitutes reversible error depends
on the degree of the failure and the circumstances surrounding the
decision.134 Viewing the three approaches as a whole, it is evident that
the SSA still requires compliance with S.S.R 00-4p and that noncompliance is not always harmless error.135
Because the VE relies on the unreliable and obsolete DOT, and
because there are no particularized standards regulating the VEs, the
integrity of VE testimony and the SSA’s entire disability determination
process is brought into question.136 Additionally, without testimony

See Steward v. Barnhart, 44 F. App’x 151, 152 (2002) (finding that the claimant was
entitled to relief because all three jobs that the VE stated that the claimant could perform
were in conflict with the DOT); see also Lancaster v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 228 F. App’x 563,
577 (2007) (finding that the ALJ did not ensure the lack of conflict and holding that the
ALJ’s failure to carry the burden at the fifth step was a reversible error). But see
Teverbaugh v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 258 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing
how the Social Security Commissioner did not dispute that the ALJ failed to question the
VE regarding whether the jobs that the VE identified as consistent with the claimant’s RFC
conflicted with the DOT). The court in Lancaster stated:
Other courts have found that claimants should not be permitted to
scan the record for implied or unexplained conflicts between the
specific testimony of an expert witness and the voluminous provisions
of the DOT, and then present that conflict as reversible error, when the
conflict was not deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in
the administrative hearing. Adopting a middle ground approach, in
which neither the DOT nor the vocational expert testimony is per se
controlling, permits a more straightforward approach.
228 F. App’x 563 at 574 (citations omitted).
135
An example of the importance of complying with S.S.R. 00-4p is evident in Prochaska v.
Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2006). In Prochaska, the claimant had a back impairment,
was obese, and offered evidence of mental impairments. Id. at 735. The ALJ found that her
allegations were not credible and, accordingly, denied her claim at the fifth step. Id.
However, the ALJ failed to ask the VE whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with
information in the DOT. Id. The court remanded the case upon finding that the ALJ did
not comply with S.S.R. 00-4p and that the error was not harmless. Id. at 731. The SSA
argued that, with respect to a significant number of jobs, no inconsistency existed between
the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Id. at 735. The court concluded, however, that it could
not determine whether the testimony was consistent with the DOT and that the ALJ should
have resolved that issue with the VE. Id. at 736. Indeed, it is evident that the ALJ must
comply with S.S.R. 00-4p and that any inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the
DOT must be addressed by the ALJ. See id.
136
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing whether the integrity of the
disability adjudication system has been compromised); see also supra note 4 and
134
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from VEs and reliance on the DOT, the SSA disability determination
process crumbles.137 Thus, because the validity of the VE’s testimony has
been compromised, the entire SSA disability determination process is
susceptible to collapse.138
In an attempt to address concerns about the validity of VE testimony
and reliance on the DOT, Part III addresses the practical effect of
applying a Daubert-type standard to VE testimony in the SSA’s disability
adjudication system. By applying this standard as proposed in Part IV,
the SSA will ensure that the integrity of its disability adjudication system
remains intact, and that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of
protection against arbitrary and capricious testimony.139
III. ANALYSIS
Justice cannot be achieved without the presumption that the legal process is
finding truth.140
Testimony from a VE serves a crucial role in disability proceedings
because it has potential to help the ALJ discover whether the claimant is
entitled to disability benefits.141 Due to the importance of this testimony,
accompanying text (discussing how the SSA previously dealt with the problem of VE
testimony at disability proceedings).
137
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing how, without reliable vocational
evidence, the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process would be
compromised); see also infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the integrity of the disability
process can be protected by promulgating a Ruling that incorporates a Daubert-type
standard applicable to VEs that includes qualifications requirements for VEs, as well as, a
mandate that VEs rely upon only reliable, complete, and up-to-date occupational data and
sources).
138
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of maintaining the
authority upon which conclusions are based in order to ensure that justice is maintained);
see also infra Part IV.A (illustrating a model Ruling that would ensure that disability
claimants are afforded a certain level of fairness through the implementation of defined
standards applicable to VEs employed by the SSA).
139
See infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the promulgation of a Social Security Ruling
applicable to VEs will bring credibility and stability to the SSA’s disability determination
process, while also ensuring that disability claimants are protected from arbitrary and
capricious vocational evidence).
140
Mason, supra note 1, at 906 (discussing the foundation upon which empirical data is
based and how if that foundation is compromised the authority of the conclusions will be
undermined).
141
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how the VE and the DOT play a
crucial role in disability proceedings because of the potential to discover the truth about
whether the claimant is disabled); see also McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir.
2004) (stating that in social security disability cases, the ALJ may depend on the VE’s
testimony to find the claimant disabled or not disabled); S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available
at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing when an
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any evidentiary-admissibility standard should consider the testimony’s
potential to acquaint the ALJ with the truth.142
When adopting the SSA’s current standard regarding VEs, the
government had to be mindful of two concerns.143 First, an allencompassing, efficient process that accounts for the wide range of
possible alleged disabilities, while also deterring abuse of disability
benefits is crucial to the management of the largest adjudication system
in the world.144 Second, the fundamental notions of fairness and
government accountability are also crucial to any adjudication system,
especially one that has such a significant impact on a large portion of
United States citizens.145 If the SSA is free to justify its policy preferences
based on testimony that may lack integrity, the SSA’s accountability—
along with the lives of millions of disability claimants—will be adversely
affected.146
Like any governmental agency with an adjudication system that has
its power vested in the United States Constitution, the SSA is obligated
to adhere to grounded and reliable testimony from its experts.147 If VEs
ALJ can rely upon a VE during the disability determination process); supra note 55 and
accompanying text (discussing that the complexity of the vocational field requires the use
of an expert).
142
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of how an
admissibility standard ought to consider the potential of a piece of evidence to acquaint a
judge with the truth).
143
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s current standard
regarding VEs and VE testimony); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing how these two
concerns can be addressed while ensuring that a balance between efficiency and fairness).
144
See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 10 (stating that the SSA has to process and adjudicate
claims as consistently, expeditiously, and cost effectively as possible); see also infra note 179
and accompanying text (discussing the need to reach a balance between SSA efficiency and
the level of fairness afforded the claimant); infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing that when the
integrity of the disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational evidence,
the balance favors SSA efficiency over the level of fairness afforded to the claimaint).
145
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 412 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). When a
federal bureaucracy treats an individual unjustly, it is a matter of concern to all people. Id.
at 412. Such a system must be fair, and it must work. Id. at 399. See also Hu et al., supra
note 6, at 10 (stating that with the SSA accepting approximately 2.5 million applications per
year, the SSA’s budgetary and welfare implications are undeniable).
146
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing that currently no standards exist to
regulate VE methodologies); see also Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (discussing how the SSA
has aggressively and successfully defended its adjudication process, which has, in
principle, been endorsed by Congress and by courts).
147
See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the vocational
expert’s testimony can only be relied on if it is reliable). In McKinnie, the court held that the
ALJ erred by not requiring the vocational expert to produce data and evidence to support
her opinion. Id. at 911. The VE testified with vague responses to the claimaint’s questions,
and she also failed to substantiate her findings with a written report or other
documentation to substantiate her figures. Id.
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are required to do something that none of them are qualified as
economists to do—statistically breaking down the source data to
estimate the number of jobs available in the appropriate categories of the
DOT—then the resulting testimony could hardly be considered
grounded and reliable.148
If the SSA bases its disability determination on testimony that is not
grounded in acceptable standards of scientific inquiry or on the best
empirical data available, then the SSA should not be allowed to rely on
these experts.149 An expert who—either due to lack of experience,
education, or simply because the sources are inadequate—manipulates
either the data or the process to reach a desired outcome should not be
relied on because his extrapolations are mere ipse dixit.150 As the Court
held in Donahue v. Barnhart, “[e]vidence is not ‘substantial’ if vital
testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.”151
This dilemma could be avoided with an adequate standard.152 For
example, because the main purpose of Daubert in the federal agency
context is “to encourage reviewing judges to be less deferential, and thus
more probing, of agency science and related administrative justifications
for regulatory action[,]”153 it seems logical that the implementation of a
148
See Traver, supra note 75 (arguing that if the vocational expert is not qualified to
perform job analysis, or if the vocational expert has not used job analysis standards
applicable to the vocational profession, then the testimony should be rejected); see also
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.1 (discussing that the VE needs to be both a placement
specialist and a labor market specialist whose experiences provide the necessary
competency to assist the ALJ in the adjudicative process).
149
See Mason, supra note 1, at 905 (stating that some science and methodologies are better
than other science and methodologies in the search for objective truth); see also TRAVER,
supra note 2, § 1900.1 (stating that it is nearly impossible to attempt to show that the VE
does not meet Social Security’s minimum standards to be a VE, as those standards are
practically nonexistent).
150
See McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 910 (holding that without first inquiring into the reliability of
the VE’s opinions, the ALJ should not have so unquestioningly accepted the VE’s testimony
that a significant number of jobs were available to the claimant, where the claimant
contested the reliability of the VE’s conclusions); see also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV
Broad Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that when an expert did not base his
opinions on data from comparable markets and instead relied upon his general expertise
and curriculum vitae, his extrapolations were mere ipse dixit).
151
Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Peabody Coal Co. v.
McCandless, 255 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2001); Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2000)).
152
See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the implementation of a Social Security Ruling
regarding vocational experts will bring credibility and stability to the disability hearing);
see also infra Part IV.A (illustrating a model rule applicable to VEs that would ensure the
integrity of the disability determination process).
153
See Raul & Dwyer, supra note 115, at 8 (arguing for the implementation of a Dauberttype standard within Environmental Protection Agency proceedings). But see Wendy
Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12
J.L. & POL’Y 589, 600–12 (2004) (explaining how implementing Daubert will greatly hinder
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Daubert-type standard would be beneficial to the SSA because it would
allow institutional credibility to remain intact and the notion of fairness
to be preserved.154
Part III.A of this Note analyzes the SSA’s reliance upon the
testimony of VEs and whether S.S.R. 00-4p is a sufficient safeguard.155
Part III.B examines the level of fairness owed to the claimant by the SSA;
in particular, this Part examines jurisprudence stipulating the degree of
due process afforded to the claimant.156 Part III.C analyzes the
possibility of implementing a Daubert-type standard applicable to VE
testimony to ensure that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of
fairness.157
A. The Vocational Expert, the Foundational Source, and the Administrative
Safeguard: The Vocational Expert’s Use of the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles and Social Security Ruling 00-4p
All experts should have some foundational source upon which to
base their empirical conclusions.158
For VEs in SSA disability
proceedings, this foundational source is, among other occupational
sources, the DOT.159 However, as mentioned previously, the DOT is
outdated and obsolete; indeed, relying on this source and its
methodology is hardly reliable.160
The idea that VEs should use reliable methods is not necessarily
grounded in Rule 702; rather, it is based in the SSA’s process that
policy decisions, by challenging the agency’s data while also imposing a greater
informational burden on agencies and slowing down the administrative process).
154
See supra note 114 and accompany text (discussing the benefits of implementing a
regulatory Daubert); see also Raul & Dwyer, supra note 115, at 8 (stating that implementing a
Daubert-type standard into administrative law would improve agency decision making and
enhance accountability); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the promulgation of a new Ruling
that incorporates a Daubert-type standard applicable to VEs engaged by the SSA).
155
See infra Part III.A (analyzing VEs and the basis upon which a VE’s testimony is
founded, namely, the DOT).
156
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the level of fairness afforded to the disability claimant).
157
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the Daubert standard and whether it would be beneficial
to hold VEs to that standard).
158
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing that the authority upon which a
conclusion is based depends upon the mode in which the conclusion was reached); see also
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad, Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that
general expertise is not sufficient to support an expert’s conclusions).
159
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how a VE’s main source relied
upon for occupational data (the DOT) and the SSA’s reliance upon that data is the keystone
in the arch that supports the entire vocational framework of the SSA).
160
See supra note 75 (discussing the antiquity of the DOT); see also infra Part IV.A.3
(discussing why a need exists to promulgate a Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable,
complete, and up-to-date occupational data and sources).
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requires every decision to be supported by substantial evidence.161 If the
VE’s testimony has been conjured out of “whole cloth[,]” then it is not
substantial and should be attacked by the claimant.162
The SSA anticipated these problems and responded by enacting
S.S.R. 00-4p, which mandates that when the VE provides evidence about
the requirements of a job, the ALJ is obligated to ask about any possible
conflict between that evidence and the information provided in the
DOT.163 Although this response adds a much needed safeguard and
heightens the evidentiary standard pertaining to VE testimony, this
solution is only a superficial band-aid on a gaping wound because the
reliance on the DOT could hardly be considered good science in the
courtroom and would in many instances be rejected as unreliable
evidence under Daubert.164 Thus, the SSA’s attempt to self-regulate by
implementing S.S.R. 00-4p seems superficial.165
One of the weaknesses of S.S.R. 00-4p is that most ALJs rely on the
vocational expert’s conclusion because the ALJ obviously lacks the
knowledge, expertise, or education in making conclusions relating to the
claimant’s ability to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
economy.166 If the ALJ was an expert in the vocational field, there would
be no need for the VE to participate in the disability determination

See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002).
See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing substantial evidence); see also
Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (stating that without substantial evidence supporting it, the
testimony is merely conjured out of “whole cloth”); see also Solomon, supra note 9, at 215
(stating that the standard argument that a claimant makes against the VE is that the VE is
merely using anecdotal experiences rather than scientific fact).
163
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and requirements
of S.S.R. 00-4p); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the need for a new Ruling directed at
VEs to ensure that the integrity of the disability determination system is not compromised).
164
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes good science
under a Daubert standard); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1. Even though the SSA
maintains that the supposed “‘experts’ are ‘reliable[,]’ there is no evaluation process,
testing, certification, or other mechanism in place to ensure their reliability. With no
vetting process in place, how does the Commissioner know her experts are ‘reliable?’”
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1.1. In most instances, the ALJ will not know that
inconsistencies exist between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, and therefore, relying on
the VE to state whether there are any inconsistencies creates an inherent conflict of interest.
Id.
165
See TRAVER, supra note 2, at § 1403.1.1 (discussing how “Rule 00-4p’s claim of
reliability is just a bit of puffery in the adjudication process[]”).
166
See S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/
SSR2000-04-di-02.html (discussing why the ALJ relies upon a VE during the hearing).
Clearly, this is why there is a need for vocational experts. Id. If ALJs had training and
expertise in the vocational field, vocational experts would not be needed because the ALJ
could easily and accurately make a conclusion based on the claimant’s assigned RFC and
the jobs that exist in significant numbers in the economy. Id.
161
162
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process. To rely on the ALJ to investigate whether the VE’s conclusion is
reliable defeats the purpose of protecting the claimant from
extrapolations that are merely ipse dixit.167 Furthermore, to require that
the claimant raise an objection to the conclusions of the VE at the
disability hearing seems contradictory to the purpose of S.S.R. 00-4p,
which assigns this task to the ALJ. Thus, courts have held that when the
VE’s reasoning is not questioned, the ALJ is entitled to accept the VE’s
conclusion.168
Taking into consideration multiple methodologies adopted by VEs
that purport to offer data about the number of jobs that exist in the
economy, these implications (e.g., that VEs lack the necessary education,
knowledge, or experience), if not resolved, will greatly undermine the
integrity of the SSA’s disability proceedings.169 In addition, the court in
Donahue held that a VE is free to give a bottom-line conclusion, provided
that the underlying occupational data and reasoning are available on
demand.170 This holding grants even broader authority to the VE, which
is bound to give rise to a VE failing to come to the hearing with
documentation and underlying occupational data to support his
conclusions.171 Moreover, the court in McKinnie v. Barnhart held that the
ALJ erred in not requiring the VE to produce the data and evidence that
supported the VE’s extrapolations, where the VE failed to substantiate
her conclusions with a written report or other documentation forming a
basis for her conclusions.172 Indeed, it is clear that S.S.R. 00-4p has

See Traver, supra note 75; see also S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (explaining why and
when the ALJ can rely upon a VE during the disability determination process).
168
Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that if no one questions
the VE’s foundation or reasoning, an ALJ is entitled to accept the vocational expert’s
conclusion, even if that conclusion differs from the DOT).
169
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1. The SSA’s reliance upon the VE and the DOT is the
foundation of the fourth and fifth steps; thus the VE’s testimony, which is based upon the
DOT, is the deciding factor in the outcome of millions of disability claims each year. Id. If
this foundation is undermined, then the entire system loses its validity. Id. See also Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (stating that “[t]he
validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which . . . [the
conclusion] was reached[]”). But see Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (stating that the SSA has
aggressively and successfully defended the adjudication process).
170
Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (citing FED. R. EVID. 704(a)) (stating that a VE is free to render
only a bottom-line determination, provided that the underlying data and reasoning are
available on demand).
171
See Solomon, supra note 9, at 209 (stating that VEs should have a valid basis for their
testimony, which consists of not only relying on the DOT but also other labor market
surveys and reference materials).
172
368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004).
167
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eroded as an administrative check on the broad credibility granted to
VEs.173
The problem revolves around proper standards regarding VEs, their
methodologies, and the sources upon which they base their
conclusions.174 If the standard regarding VEs was heightened, the
number of occasions that a VE who is not qualified to perform
occupational analysis would be reduced.175 If these occasions were
reduced, then the fear of the VE’s testimony adversely affecting the level
of fairness afforded the claimant would be greatly diminished.176
B. A Need for a Standard Applicable to Vocational Experts That Will Ensure
the Claimant is Afforded an Adequate Level of Fairness: Examining
Jurisprudence Stipulating the Degree of Fairness Afforded to the Claimant
With the seemingly high degree of deference given to the ALJ with
regard to evidentiary matters and the relatively broad credibility granted
to the VE’s testimony, the question bound to arise is whether an
adequate level of fairness is afforded disability claimants.177
In
Richardson, the Court mandated that evidence not normally admissible in
regular court proceedings could constitute substantial evidence in

173
See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the erosion of S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec.
4, 2000)); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the practical effect of promulgating a new
Social Security Ruling directed at VEs and the resulting safeguards of such a Ruling).
174
See supra note 114 and accompany text (discussing the practical effects of
implementing a Daubert-type evidentiary standard); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing
what a model Ruling applicable to VEs might look like).
175
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1. No longer would disability claimants be subject to the
SSA’s belief that the DOT and its related data are better than nothing. Id.; see also infra Part
IV.A.2 (discussing the positive benefits of promulgating a Ruling that includes qualification
requirements for VEs engaged by the SSA).
176
See generally 70 Fed. Reg. 43589 (July 27, 2005). The previous Commissioner stated
that the SSA would study the issue of occupational information with the announcement
made in the Federal Register. Id. But see TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (stating that “as of
October 1, 2007, the SSA continues to [use] [sic] the DOT . . . ”).
177
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing whether an adequate level of
fairness is afforded to the claimant); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2000) (stating that the Social
Security Commissioner shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations
and to establish procedures necessary to carry out such regulations, and that the Social
Security Commissioner shall adopt reasonable and proper regulations to provide for the
nature and extent of proof, evidence, and the method of taking and furnishing the same in
order to establish the claimant’s right to Social Security disability benefits); Id. § 405(b)
(2000) (stating that evidence may be admissible at Social Security disability hearings even
though it is inadmissible under the rules of evidence that are applicable to court
procedure); infra Part IV.A (discussing the promulgation of a model Social Security Ruling
that would ensure that the disability claimant is provided a certain level of fairness,
thereby protecting the claimant’s due process rights).
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disability hearings.178 One of the justifications for this holding was that
the disability hearings should be understandable for the layman
claimant, but the Court could have hardly meant that relaxation of
evidentiary rules in disability hearings was meant to relax any obligation
of fairness owed to the disability claimant.179 The Court’s holding that
the medical report was admissible was not based on the notion of the
rules being relaxed, but instead on the fact that four other medical
experts had arrived at the same conclusion.180
Richardson arguably would have been decided differently if the
medical expert’s report instead would have been an occupational report
completed by a VE who was not qualified (to manipulate job data and
identify components of job groups provided by the various vocational
sources), and whose field was a relatively new science.181 The Court in
Richardson arguably would have been more concerned about an
infringement of procedural due process afforded to disability
claimants.182 But what has been perceived as a victory for disability
claimants actually hinders the level of protection granted to the
claimants from unqualified VEs or conclusions arrived at by mere
extrapolations which are ipse dixit.183
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971) (holding that the strict rules of
evidence, applicable in the courtroom, do not bar the admission of otherwise pertinent
evidence at social security disability hearings).
179
Id. at 401. The right to Social Security benefits is earned, and the extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which the claimant
may be condemned to suffer a grievous loss. Id. But “when a grave injustice is wreaked on
an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to
everyone[] . . . .” Id. at 413 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also MILLS, supra note 1, at 2
(discussing how the SSA’s priority is to quickly and efficiently process disability
applications and hearings); infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing that when the integrity of the
disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational evidence, the balance
between SSA efficiency and the level of fairness afforded to the claimaint favors SSA
efficiency).
180
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 402.
181
TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (discussing how VE testimony lacks validity because it
is based on the outdated DOT and because of the lack of standards that VEs must satisify in
order to testify at SSA hearings); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
how the vocational field is a relatively new discipline); infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing the
benefits of promulgating a Ruling to ensure that disability claimants are protected from
arbitrary and capricious vocational evidence).
182
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of qualifications that VEs
have relative to statistical evaluation); see also Part IV.A.2 (discussing how the
promulgation of a Ruling mandating that VEs meet certain qualification standards,
including statistical or economical evaluation experience, would ensure that vocational
evidence is reliable).
183
See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing how
manipulating either the data or the process to reach a desired outcome is not reliable
because the extrapolations are merely ipse dixit); see also Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to
178
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Subsequently, courts have interpreted the relaxed evidentiary
standards in SSA proceedings to mean that heightened standards for
vocational experts are not necessary.184 For example, in Bayliss v.
Barnhart, the Court declared that the VE’s expertise establishes the
necessary foundation for his testimony, and so, no additional foundation
is necessary.185 In Bayliss, the claimant argued that the requirements for
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, established in Daubert
should apply to the testimony of the VE.186 However, the Bayliss Court
determined that because the Daubert decision rested on the interpretation
of Rule 702, the safeguard implications established in Daubert, and
subsequently extended to all expert testimony via Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), did not govern the admissibility of
evidence before the ALJ in SSA proceedings.187
In Donahue v. Barnhart, the Court held that although Rule 702 does
not apply to SSA proceedings, the notion that VEs should use reliable
methods does not depend on Rule 702 because the Social Security
proceedings require every decision to be supported by substantial
evidence.188 Additionally, the Court pointed out that “[e]vidence is not
‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.”189
These cases suggest two propositions: first, in part because of
Richardson, Rule 702 and subsequently the safeguard implications of
Daubert do not apply; and second, the foundation requirements of the
VE’s expertise are not uniformly established.190 The interpretations of

Cross-Examine Physicians in Social Security Disability Cases, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 317, 318 (2000) (discussing how Richardson v. Perales was first interpreted as
granting procedural safeguards to disability claimants and was subsequently interpreted as
a rejection of those safeguards).
184
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2005).
185
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing how the VE’s expertise provides
the necessary foundation for his or her testimony); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.
186
See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218. The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and Richardson,
holding that the ALJ may receive evidence even though the evidence would not be
admissible in court. Id.
187
Id. at 1218 n.4.
188
See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002).
189
Id. Interestingly, even though the court declared that Rule 702 does not apply, the
court later cited to Rule 704(a), holding that a VE is free to give a bottom line
determination, provided that the underlying data and reasoning are available on demand.
Id.
190
See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of implementing a
regulatory Daubert); see also Elliott, supra note 115, at 10126 (stating that the harms of junk
science within agency proceedings demand appropriate gatekeeping); supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing how there is a lack of uniformity regarding the foundational
requirements of vocational experts). But see WAGNER, supra note 153, at 600–12 (discussing
the dangers of Daubert in the Administrative sector, noting that Daubert will adversely
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Richardson somehow seem flawed because a system that was meant to be
informal to benefit the layman claimant should not be allowed to relax
the level of fairness the system owes to the claimant.191 Moreover, the
rejection of a Daubert-like standard to VEs does not seem justified.192
Applying a Daubert-like standard would not adversely affect the
substantial evidence requirement.193 Rather, it would ensure the
integrity of the administration of the system by permitting only qualified
experts, whose testimony is based on sufficient and updated data that is
formulated through the use of reliable and accepted principles.194
C. Why the Vocational Expert Should Be Held to a Daubert-Type Standard
In Donahue, Judge Easterbrook asked the opposing parties at oral
argument what makes a VE an “expert” and “where [does] the
information in the [DOT] c[o]me from[].”195 Not surprisingly, both
parties “did not know.”196 This predicament would not exist if the SSA
adopted a Daubert-type standard.197 Implementing a Daubert-type
approach would ensure the following: (1) that all VEs adhere to reliable
methodologies and data to support their findings; (2) that the level of
fairness afforded to claimants is not jeopardized because of questionable
testimony from VEs; (3) that uniformity exists within the SSA disability
affect policy decisions because it requires increased scrutiny of data and imposition of a
greater burden on agencies to provide better information pertaining to its holdings).
191
See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which the claimant
may be condemned to suffer a grievous loss); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing that when
the integrity of the disability process is compromised due to unreliable vocational
evidence, the balance between SSA efficiency and the level of fairness afforded to the
claimant favors SSA efficiency).
192
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of justification for not
implementing a Daubert-type standard for VEs within disability proceedings); see also
Elliott, supra note 115, at 10126 (stating that the harms of junk science in agency
proceedings demand appropriate gatekeeping).
193
See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that regulatory
Daubert would have on the agency).
194
See supra note 110 and accompanying text (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702) (discussing how
an expert witness may testify when the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case); see also infra Part IV.A.
(presenting a model Social Security Ruling that incorporates aspects of Rule 702 under the
guise of a Daubert-type standard).
195
Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445–46 (7th Cir. 2002).
196
Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
197
See Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 299 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) (stating that Daubert required judges to
determine whether a proffered expert opinion is both reliable and relevant, i.e. whether it
isbased on knowledge derived from a valid scientific method).
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proceedings; and (4) that integrity in the fourth and fifth steps of the
sequential evaluation process is maintained.198
The claimant seeking disability benefits is entitled to a certain level
of fairness, which “is applicable to the adjudicative [and] administrative
proceeding involving ‘differing rules of fair play,[’] . . . and . . . [to] the
‘extent to which procedural due process must be afforded[,] the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer
grievous loss’.’”199 The claimant who is denied disability benefits stands
to suffer a grave loss (i.e., the loss of funds to sustain a meager living and
funds to treat the severe impairment that hinders the ability to work),
while the burden placed on the SSA is merely a more rigorous standard
for its VEs, which would not adversely affect the substantial evidence
standard, but rather complement it.200
Furthermore, S.S.R. 00-4p already mandates that the ALJ act as a
gatekeeper by requiring that the ALJ inquire into whether there are any
inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the foundational source
(e.g., the DOT).201 Extending the other safeguards of Daubert to address
the problem of questionable VE testimony due to a VE’s lack of statistical
evaluation expertise, unreliable methodologies, or outdated source of
occupational data, would not significantly burden the SSA. Indeed, any
burden to the SSA would be outweighed only by the fact that the
grievous loss typically suffered by the disability claimant would be
averted.202 Implementing a regulatory Daubert approach will force the

See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of implementing a
Daubert-type standard); see also BUSH, supra note 39, § 340 (discussing how there is a lack of
uniformity regarding the foundational requirements of vocational experts); supra note 179
(discussing the Court’s balancing test which balances the claimant’s level of loss and the
burden placed on the government to implement safeguards); infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing
how implementation of a Daubert-type standard will assure institutional integrity).
199
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1971) (citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
442 (1960); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970)); see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing the level of loss that disabled and disadvantaged claimants
potentially face).
200
See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing how the benefits of
implementing additional safeguards to protect the claimant from suffering a grievous loss
is not outweighed by the burden of implementing a Daubert-style approach in addition to
the already established S.S.R. 00-4p); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of
enacting a Ruling applicable to VEs that incorporates a Daubert-type standard).
201
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and shortcomings
of S.S.R. 00-4p and how this ruling has been eroded); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (discussing
why there is a need for promulgating a new ruling that is applicable to VEs).
202
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of the VE’s
testimony because the VE lacks qualifications in statistical evaluation); see also Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (discussing the Court’s balancing test which balances the
claimant’s level of loss and the burden placed on the government in implementing
198
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SSA to better explain itself and better document its findings, thus
ensuring that the claimant is afforded an adequate level of fairness and
the integrity of the Social Security disability proceedings remains
intact.203
The issue comes down to fairness.204 Although the SSA is the largest
adjudication system in the world and considers millions of applications a
year, this should not exempt it from complying with the fundamental
notion of fairness.205 The SSA has implemented a regulation that
mandates the ALJ inquire into any inconsistencies between the VE’s
testimony and the DOT; it also requires that the evidence be substantial
for the ALJ to make a decision. However, this level of protection granted
to claimants is nominal.206
The inadequacies are apparent when the system struggles to define
who qualifies as an expert.207 If the VEs are unqualified in statistical
evaluation and yet are likely to implement various methodologies—
which arguably are not testable and are based on an obsolete
occupational source—how can they be referred to as experts, and why
should the SSA rely on their testimony in a disability proceeding?208
As if the deck was not already stacked against the claimant, a
claimant who wishes to challenge a VE’s testimony by arguing that the

safeguards); supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
implementing a Daubert-type standard).
203
See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s test which balances
the claimant’s level of loss and the burden placed on the government in implementing
safeguards); see also infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing how implementation of a Daubert-type
standard will assure institutional integrity). But see WAGNER, supra note 154, at 100–12
(discussing how implementing Daubert will infect policy decisions under the guise of
challenging data, imposing a greater informational burden on agencies and slowing down
the administrative process).
204
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of fairness with regard to
expert witness testimony).
205
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing act between
efficiency and fairness); see also Hu et al., supra note 6, at 10 (stating that theoretically all
disabled applicants should be granted disability benefits and all physical and mentally able
applicants denied benefits; however, as a result of imperfections in the adjudication
process, inevitably some applicants who are disabled are denied).
206
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3 (stating that Rule 00-4p explains how VEs are relied
upon for guidance, but that this Ruling fails to explain what makes a VE an expert); see
supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing how the Social Security Administration
has implemented what has turned out to be merely quasi-safeguards).
207
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue v. Barnhart’s
requirement that the claimant raise any objections to the VE’s testimony during the
hearing, or else the right to object is deemed waived).
208
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing how the DOT and its
methodology became obsolete upon the advent of the Department of Labor’s
implementation of O*NET).
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VE lacks qualifications, that a conflict of interest exists because the VE is
hired and paid by the SSA, or that due process was violated, will rarely
be successful by challenging the VE’s qualifications or by challenging
that a conflict of interest exists.209 Additionally, if arguing that due
process was violated, the claimant must show that the ALJ’s behavior, in
the context of the whole case, was so extreme as to display clear inability
to render a fair judgment—again, in such a case, a claimaint will rarely
be successful.210
These obstacles are nearly impossible to overcome, and it does not
help the claimant that the courts are extremely deferential to the SSA.211
Additionally, the claimant is more disadvantaged because he or she
cannot directly attack the reliability of the VE’s testimony; rather, the
claimant is forced to establish that the ALJ’s conduct is of such an
extreme nature that a fair judgment is not possible.212
For these reasons, the SSA should apply its statutory directives more
vigorously by promulgating a Social Security Ruling directed at
primarily VEs, the methodologies VEs implement, and the occupational
sources on which VEs rely. This promulgation should include the
Daubert-type safeguards which are applied to all experts engaged in the
federal judiciary.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
When a grave injustice is wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful
federal bureaucracy, it is a matter of concern to everyone.213
Flowing from this analysis is one method that the SSA can use to
address the intricate dilemmas regarding VE testimony at disability
209
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1900.3 (discussing how because there is a very minimal
standard to be a VE, most challenges of the VE’s qualifications will fail); see also
MCCORMICK, supra note 57, at 65 (discussing how the conflict of interest challenge will be
rebuked because the VE receives the same fee no matter what way his testimony is
directed).
210
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantage that the
claimant faces if the claimant attempts to directly challenge the reliability of the VE’s
testimony).
211
See Hu et al., supra note 6, at 11 (discussing how the SSA has aggressively and
successfully defended its adjudication process, which has, in principle, been endorsed by
Congress and the courts).
212
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s policies prohibiting an
attack on the reliability of the VE testimony).
213
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how the outcome in millions of disability claims
annually are decided at the fourth and fifth steps where the VE’s testimony is the lynch-pin
to the claimant being entitled to benefits or not entitled to benefits).
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hearings. Promulgating a Social Security Ruling applicable to VEs will
adequately address the concerns raised by unreliable VE testimony.
Part IV.A.1 discusses a method that the SSA should use to
appropriately implement Daubert standards for experts in nonadministrative settings, such as the federal judiciary, and also Dauberttype standards within federal administrative settings, such as the Food
and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.214
In addition to implementing Daubert-type standards applicable to
VEs, Part IV.A.2 discusses how the promulgation should ensure that the
qualifications of VEs are closely scrutinized and that a statistical and
economical competency model qualifies VEs to break down and match
the occupational code numbers with the existing jobs.215 Additionally,
Part IV.A.3 discusses how the Social Security Ruling should mandate
that VEs base their testimony only on current data and sources, thereby
prohibiting the use of the obsolete DOT.216 Finally, Part IV.A.3 briefly
summarizes the advantages of promulgating a Social Security Ruling
applicable only to VEs at disability hearings.217
A. Promulgation of a Social Security Ruling Applicable to Vocational Experts
1.

Implementation of a Daubert-type Standard for Vocational Experts

The purpose of a Daubert-type standard is to subject federal agencies
that deal with technical scientific data to a high standard.218 Because VE
testimony is the lynch pin to the determination of millions of disability
hearings each year, and to the determination of technical issues that arise
regarding the occupational field, VEs must be held to a high standard.219

See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the implementation of a Daubert-type standard within
SSA disability proceedings directed at VEs, and how this standard would ensure that VE
methodologies and testimonies are reliable).
215
See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how the Ruling should incorporate qualification
requirements for VEs, thereby ensuring that all VEs meet high standards before they can
give testimony at SSA disability proceedings).
216
See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the need for the SSA to prohibit the use of the obsolete
DOT and other outdated supplements which are not reliable sources for occupational
data).
217
See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the advantages of promulgating a Social Security
Ruling that is directed explicitly at VEs, their methodologies, and the occupational sources
upon which they may base their conclusions).
218
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the four Daubert factors for
assessing the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique); see also Miller & Rein,
supra note 114, at 298 (discussing how both the EPA and the FDA require scientific and
technical knowledge and thus should be subject to Daubert discipline).
219
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that a higher standard should
govern the admissibility of VE testimony because of the technical nature of the
214
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This better-than-nothing mentality is not a reliable basis on which to
award and deny critical, life-sustaining benefits to the disabled and
disadvantaged, and absolutely no reason exists to allow ‘junk science’ or
unreliable technical information to provide legally adequate support for
an agency’s decision in any type of administrative action.220 An ALJ
should no longer merely defer to a proposed VE on the ground that the
VE has good credentials in a field that is unusual or difficult.221 Because
under Daubert the expert’s evidence has to be adequate to support a
decision, the evidence must be based on knowledge—not mere
speculation.222 Thus, when the VE bases his or her testimony on
unreliable occupational data or unsupported assumptions, that
testimony should not be accepted, because justice will never be achieved
without the presumption that the legal process is aimed at finding the
truth.223 Because Daubert provides a suitable framework for reviewing
the quality of agency science, and because a Daubert-type standard
would ensure that the VE’s scientific methodology maintains a certain
level of legitimacy, a Social Security Ruling incorporating a Daubert-type
standard within the disability adjudication process should be
promulgated.224
2.

Scrutinize the Qualifications of Vocational Experts

Along with implementing a Daubert-type standard, the Social
Security Ruling should include language addressing qualification
standards for VEs. Considering that no requirements exist to become a
VE, and no training, supervision, or credential requirements apply to
VEs, the Ruling proposed in this Note can address this concern by
methodologies of VEs); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of promulgating a
Ruling that heightens the standards for VEs engaged by the SSA).
220
TRAVER, supra note 2, §1400 (discussing how the SSA is traditionally slow to act in the
face of change); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing how junk science
should not be tolerated within any agency adjudication proceeding).
221
See Miller & Rein, supra note 114, at 298 (discussing how both the EPA and the FDA
require scientific and technical knowledge and thus should be subject to Daubert
discipline).
222
Id. at 315.
223
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the value and importance of
maintaining integrity within the process of finding truth); see also supra note 149 and
accompanying text (discussing the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are
better than others in the quest for truth).
224
See supra Parts IV.A.1–3 (discussing how the implementation of a Daubert-type
standard would be beneficial to the SSA because institutional credibility would remain
intact and the notion of fairness would be preserved); see also supra note 115 and
accompanying text (discussing how the implementation of a Daubert-type standard will
force agencies to use good science within adjudication proceedings).
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implementing a qualification standard that VEs must meet in order to be
engaged by the SSA.225
Additionally, a specific ruling pertaining to VEs could provide
guidelines concerning acceptable methodologies for VEs to rely on when
arriving at a conclusion.226
The ruling addressing acceptable
methodologies should coincide with the implementation of a Dauberttype standard that would ensure the legitimacy of the VE’s
methodologies because, as stated previously, some sciences and
methodologies are better than other sciences and methodologies in the
search for objective truth.227
3.

Mandate the Use of Current Occupational Data and Sources

By promulgating a Ruling that incorporates a Daubert-type standard
and specifically addresses VE qualifications and acceptable
methodologies, the SSA will be closer to restoring credibility in the
disability determination process. However, the Ruling would not be
successful if it did not address the concern about the sources upon which
VEs base their conclusions.228
If the promulgation included an
additional requirement—that all sources upon which a VE bases
conclusions be reliable, complete, and up-to-date—the SSA would
ensure the integrity of VE testimony.229
The SSA has an obligation to disability claimants to ensure that VEs
(whose testimony might adversely affect the claimant’s case) base their
225
See TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1302 (discussing how no standards exist to become a VE—
no training, no supervision, and no credential requirements). Although the SSA’s last
promulgated ruling, 00-4p, addresses some issues regarding VEs, and although HALLEX
has some guidelines for VEs, there is no particular Regulation or Ruling that specifically
addresses VEs. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000)); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1403.1 (discussing the
requirements listed in SSA’s HALLEX).
226
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of VE’s statistical and
economical competency and approaches that can be implemented to ensure accuracy).
227
Mason, supra note 1, at 905; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing
how the SSA is traditionally slow to act); supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing
the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are better than others in the quest
for truth).
228
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how reliance on the outdated and
obsolete DOT undermines the adjudication process); see also TRAVER, supra note 2, § 1503
(pointing out that the SSA is slow to act in the face of change, and explaining why the SSA
has not published any new regulations to bridge the divide between its regulations and the
O*NET methodology).
229
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how VE testimony lacks validity,
and, thus, the entire adjudication process fails because the integrity of the system has been
compromised and concluding that this could be remedied by restoring the integrity of VE
testimony).
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findings on a foundational source that is up-to-date and reliable.230 As
previously discussed, the DOT is neither up-to-date nor reliable.231 In
fact, the DOT is obsolete, and the SSA’s failure to update it implies that
the SSA has determined the DOT and its related data are better than
nothing.232 However, as also previously mentioned, this type of
mentality should not be tolerated, even in a massive bureaucratic
institution.233 A better-than-nothing mentality is not a reliable basis on
which to award and deny critical, life-sustaining benefits to the disabled
and disadvantaged.234
The following is a proposed Social Security Ruling incorporating a
Daubert-type standard applicable to VEs. It outlines the qualifications for
VEs and describes acceptable occupational resources:
Purpose: This Ruling clarifies our standards for the use
of Vocational Experts (“VEs”) who provide evidence at
hearings before Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”),
and other reliable sources of occupational data in the
235
evaluation of disability claims.
I.

This Ruling emphasizes that the methodology of a VE
must: (1) be tested and capable of repetition; (2) have
been subjected to peer-review; (3) have a known or
potential rate of error and standards that control the
technique’s operation; and (4) have enjoyed a general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation of the SSA to ensure
that disability claimants are affored fair hearings).
231
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of the DOT and
why VE should not rely upon the outdated occupational data contained within the DOT).
232
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the SSA’s mentality regarding
the DOT); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing how the SSA made the
announcement that it was going to prohibit the use of the DOT, but then never carried out
the plan).
233
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing how the balance between a
better-than-nothing mindset and the crucial disability benefits that many claimants rely
upon should tilt toward the latter).
234
See supra note 1 and accompany text (discussing how the notion of justice will never
be achieved without the presumption that the legal process is aimed at finding truth); see
also supra note 149 (discussing the need for legitimacy and how certain methodologies are
better than others in the quest for truth).
235
See generally S.S.R. 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/
di/02/SSR2000-04-di-02.html (illustrating the general format and structure of SSA
Rulings).
230
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II. Before the SSA may use a VE, said expert must meet the
SSA’s requirements. A VE must have: (1) satisfied all
educational requirements, including (i) a Ph.D. in the
occupational field; and (ii) documented occupational
research abilities; (2) proven employment-placement
experience; and (3) proven statistical or economic
proficiency.
Additionally, the SSA shall keep a
documented file on VEs. This file must include the above
mentioned documents. To ensure ongoing competency,
the SSA shall require VEs to attend training sessions.
Last, the SSA shall review the qualifications of VEs on a
yearly basis.
III. For those VEs who meet the qualification standard, the
ALJ may rely on the VE’s conclusions, only after the ALJ
ensures that the conclusions were based on reliable,
complete, and up-to-date occupational data. Additionally,
the ALJ must obtain an explanation for any deviations
from the standard methodology and must explain in the
decision how any identified deviation was resolved.
B. The Advantages of the Proposed Social Security Ruling Applicable to
Vocational Experts
Promulgating a Ruling that applies only to VEs testifying at a
disability hearing has three advantages. First, implementing a Ruling
that incorporates a Daubert-type standard will ensure that VE
methodologies are reliable.236 Second, promulgating a Ruling that
describes the requirements to be a VE, including, but not limited to, the
educational background, the credential requirements and the required
training needed, will ensure that the SSA only relies on qualified
experts.237 Third, a Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable
occupational sources will ensure the legitimacy of VE testimony and
thus the entire disability system.238

236
See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the practical effects of promulgating a Social Security
Ruling, applicable to VEs, that incorporates a Daubert-type standard).
237
See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the benefits of implementing a Ruling that defines
the qualification requirements to be a VE engaged by the SSA).
238
See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the positive impact of promulgating a Social Security
Ruling that mandates the use of only reliable, complete, and up-to-date occupational data
and sources).
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V. CONCLUSION
Vocational evidence is the building block of the fourth and fifth steps
of the sequential disability determination process. With millions of
disability benefits granted or denied at those steps, the significance of
this vocational evidence should not be understated. Vocational evidence
within the SSA’s disability adjudication process is valuable for its ability
to lead the ALJ to truth, but only if it is based upon reliable and up-todate occupational data. If the integrity of this testimonial evidence is
compromised, then the entire disability process crumbles because the
validity of the conclusion depends primarily upon the manner in which
it was reached.
With a large adjudication system, both the efficiency of the SSA and
the level of fairness afforded to disability claimants must be balanced.
Currently, this balance favors the disability system, and the SSA has
adopted a better-than-nothing mentality concerning the vocational
evidence dilemma. However, a balance between efficiency and the level
of fairness provided to the claimant can be achieved by promulgating a
Ruling applicable to VEs. This Ruling would incorporate a Daubert-type
standard, a concrete guideline regarding VE qualifications and
acceptable methodologies, and a requirement that all VE testimony be
based on up-to-date, reliable occupational data. The Ruling proposed in
this Note addresses the current imbalance, and correspondingly allows
the SSA to ensure the integrity of its disability adjudication system and
maintain a system whereby claimants are afforded an adequate level of
protection against arbitrary and capricious testimony.
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